I was not able to make it to the House earlier, Sir David; I would like to express my sympathies to everyone involved in the tragic events in Tunisia. Our thoughts are with the families all across the United Kingdom, but especially the people in Scotland who have been caught up.
I want to speak to new clause 32. Part 2 of the Bill devolves significant new powers to Scotland over income tax and other taxes, and it is a real opportunity to provide the powerhouse Parliament promised by the Smith agreement. Clauses 12, 13 and 14 make provision for transfer to the Scottish Parliament of the power to set rates and bands of income tax, including, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) was pushing for, the ability to set a zero rate. The full impact of that and other tax measures should not be downplayed.
Lord Smith himself outlined that the measures proposed in the agreement would create one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world. When taking taxation and spending clauses together, Scotland would be only slightly behind the Canadian provinces and Swiss cantons. Likewise, according to the OECD, in exercising power over setting both the rates and bases of income tax, Scotland would rank above sub-central legislatures in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the US and even Germany.
The economic evidence suggests that fiscal devolution can work. It is our responsibility, and that of the Scottish Government, to make sure that it does—that is the genesis of our new clause 32. However, these are hugely complicated processes; anyone who has tried to
read the fiscal framework analysis in the Smith agreement will know that. I note that the Scottish National party and its new friend, the hon. Member for Gainsborough, have tabled new clauses that would seek to devolve income tax in its entirety.
I should say at the start that those are perfectly legitimate arguments that have been debated at great length at both the Calman and Smith commissions. Labour disagrees, because we believe fundamentally in the pooling and sharing of resources across the United Kingdom; that is not a criticism of the SNP position, but merely a disagreement on a fundamental broad principle. We have rightly and repeatedly criticised the Smith agreement and the Bill on a number of occasions, particularly on Second Reading and in last Monday’s debate, but I agree with the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie): in this instance at least, the Bill and the Smith agreement have got it right. That is probably why there are so few substantive amendments to the income tax clauses. The Chartered Institute of Taxation has echoed that by saying that the commission has made a
“pragmatic set of proposals which shows a lot of thought has been given to balancing the desire of Scots for greater tax powers against the practical obstacles to devolution”.
It is worth reflecting on the Scottish Parliament’s current position on income tax. Since 1999, Scotland has been able to vary the rate of income tax by 3p in the pound. Despite the current clamour for more powers, that power has never been used—incidentally, I believe that it has now lapsed, which shows the problems with the fiscal framework. Notwithstanding that, under the Scotland Act 2012, and as a result of the Calman commission, the Scottish Parliament has been afforded control over the first 10p of the basic rate of tax. Obviously, the Smith agreement and the Bill go much further.
The Scottish Parliament will have total control over income tax rates and thresholds and complete freedom over the levels at which those rates and thresholds are set. That is significant as the estimated devolved income tax liabilities on income tax in 2013-14 amounted to almost £11 billion. That is a considerable sum, the collection and deployment of which confers a substantial degree of responsibility on the Scottish Parliament. If they wish, the Scottish Government—of any colour—can increase or decrease that liability.