It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship in this Committee, Sir David, and to speak to our new clause 54. I enjoyed much of what the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) had to say, apart from his description of the “separatist problem”, which we tend to call “national aspiration”—I think I know what he meant. I am conscious of the time, so I shall try to cover the debate as briefly as I can.
Paragraphs 75 to 79 of the Smith agreement covered issues of income tax, and stated that income tax would remain a shared tax and that both the UK and the Scottish Parliaments would share control of it. The agreement said essentially that MPs representing constituencies across the whole of the UK would continue to decide the UK’s budget, including income tax. That certainly makes sense with the very partial devolution suggested by the Bill.
Within that framework, the Scottish Parliament will have the power to set the rates of income tax and the thresholds at which they are paid for non-savings and non-dividend income only. As part of that, there will be no restrictions on the thresholds or rates that the Scottish Parliament can set. All other aspects of income tax will remain reserved, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough said, so that even such things as the definition of income could be changed by a UK Government, making subsequent and consequential serious change to the yield forecast by the Scottish Government. That is one reason why, with the partial devolution, we should all continue to vote on that component of income tax in the Westminster Parliament—and it is an even stronger reason, of course, for the devolution of all income tax.
The Scottish Parliament Information Centre analysis for the Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee—for the rest of the evening, termed “the devolution committee”—found in its interim report on the draft Scotland Bill that draft clauses 10 to 12, now clauses 12 to 14,
“broadly seek to give effect to the extension of income tax powers recommended by the Smith Commission. These would give the Scottish Parliament the power to set rates and bands in relation to non-savings and non-dividend income…above the UK personal allowance.”
Clause 14 also deals with the interaction between income tax and capital gains tax. Currently, individuals who pay income tax at the higher rate also pay CGT at the higher rate. The clause sets out that the rate of CGT that applies to Scottish income tax payers will continue to be calculated using the UK income tax rate limits. That would create an imbalance should there be a change or proposed change for Scotland and people choose to do something in a different way.
There were, however, no draft clauses in relation to the corresponding adjustment in the block grant or the Scottish Government’s reimbursing the UK Government for costs arising from implementation or administration of the powers. Can the Secretary of State confirm that these recommendations do not require legislation?
The Scottish Parliament’s devolution committee interim report said in its conclusion about income tax powers that
“the essence of the Smith Commission’s recommendations has been translated appropriately by the previous UK Government into the draft legislative clauses”,
and that it had “no particular concerns” with “the drafting”. However, it highlighted the
“significant issues still to be resolved regarding the implementation of the new powers, such as an appropriate definition of residency…the details of the administration of the new regime (who collects the tax and how it will function…the need to avoid double taxation and the timing and phasing of the new powers on income tax relative to those already devolved under the Scotland Act 2012”.
Those are all matters that I am sure the Scottish Secretary will address. At paragraph 166, the devolution committee also recommended that
“details on the implementation of the new powers over income tax be produced before the Scottish Parliament is expected to give its legislative consent”.
That is extremely important. It concluded, too, that
“any final detail of the fiscal framework and the other matters we have considered is provided to the Scottish Parliament before the question of legislative consent to any new bill is considered”.
That is a view endorsed by the Scottish Government, and I understand that discussions on these issues are ongoing with the UK Government, in parallel with the passage of the legislation.
It is normal practice for the Scottish Parliament to consider legislative consent before the final stage of a Bill in the Commons; with the Report stage likely in the autumn, usual practice would suggest September. However, the devolution committee suggested 2016 as a more likely date, so when does the Secretary of State believe the Bill will reach Report?
Because of the lack of information on the various technical aspects of the delivery of the tax powers, beyond the wording of the Bill, the committee said:
“As yet, we are not able to conclude that we are content with the fiscal framework and no detriment arrangements as these details are currently being discussed between the two governments.”
Will the Secretary of State confirm that discussions are under way and update us on progress, particularly in respect of the no detriment and no advantage clauses—principles agreed by Smith before the committee reported?
The devolution committee also said:
“both the process of these negotiations and the outcome requires proper parliamentary scrutiny. We recommend both Governments reach an urgent agreement on just how this will be achieved and for the Scottish Government to report to the Committee on what arrangements it proposes to put in place for parliamentary oversight.”
Will the Secretary of State describe what actions his Government are taking in respect of parliamentary oversight, particularly if we do not—as may well be the case—get through the debate on all the clauses and groups of amendments tabled for debate today?
In their response to the devolution committee’s interim report, the Scottish Government made it clear that they were
“broadly content with the clauses in the Scotland Bill relating to taxation”.
It added, however:
“as the Committee recognised, there will need to be extensive discussions between the Scottish and UK Governments over the plans for implementing these provisions.”
I note at this point that there were changes between the draft clauses and the Scotland Bill. In paragraph 165 of the interim report, the devolution committee highlighted one area that required specific clarification, so I ask the Secretary of State to confirm—I am sure he will—whether clause 12(5) of the published Bill now contains a change to specify that a zero rate of income tax is possible?
It is also worth saying a little about the nature of the taxation powers, which has been touched on. They are very limited. Even if we include the VAT assignation, the Scottish Parliament would raise the equivalent of around 50% of devolved expenditure. However, excluding the VAT assignation, the figure falls to barely a third. That is important because many of the submissions to the devolution committee called for more. In its written evidence, the Scottish Trades Union Congress called in its recommendation 2.1 for the
“devolution and assignment of taxation amounting to…two thirds of Scottish public spending (over 50% of all spending in Scotland)”.
The Bill clearly does not reach that standard.
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The point is important also because it does not match what the UK Government said in their Command Paper “Scotland in the United Kingdom”, which claimed:
“As a result of the Smith Commission Agreement, the Scottish Parliament will control around 60 per cent of spending in Scotland and retain around 40 per cent of Scottish tax.”
Clearly, that claim works only by including the assigned VAT; the taxes that Scotland will actually control amount to less than 30%. The full devolution of all tax on income would help resolve that problem.
It is also worth noting the evidence to the devolution committee of Professor Andrew Hughes-Hallett, who warned of the risks associated with reliance on one single tax. He said a great deal about the possible compositions of the tax base, but in essence his point was that Scotland needs a diverse tax base. We believe that adding responsibility for savings and investment income along with every other aspect of income tax would at least offer a partial solution to that problem.
Furthermore, Professor Anton Muscatelli told the Committee:
“the cleanest solution would have been to have a package that would have involved not only complete income tax devolution, including the personal allowance”
but additional devolution of national insurance contributions, which would have
“allowed some flexibility around employers’ national insurance contributions to try to affect employment, since that issue seems to be of concern to Scotland.”
To try to resolve a number of the problems that we have identified, our new clause 54 seeks the full devolution of responsibility for all tax on income.
One of the other issues that new clause 54 seeks to address is that raised by the National Union of Students Scotland, which told the devolution Committee that it believed
“that by only devolving non-savings taxes, the Scottish Parliament is put in a precarious position for any future tax rises, and particularly the introduction of a higher rate of tax. As was seen in the year before the introduction of the 50p rate in 2010, and then in the year following the reduction to 45p, those who it affected were able to shift extremely large sums of money between years and between income and dividends, in order to either escape or benefit from the changes in rates. Without the ability to tax dividends, there is a great risk that Scotland will never be able to fully utilise or benefit from any future reform of income tax.”