As I explained, my personal view is that we should devolve the whole thing. It makes logical sense. As I said, setting the thresholds is often much the most interesting part of tax policy in modern Parliaments. When our friends the Liberals were in power with us—we remember those happy times—was not their proudest boast that they, as members of the Government, had lifted hundreds of thousands of people out of tax altogether?
There is an interesting argument here. For the record, I am dubious about lifting the threshold. It is expensive, and surely more, not fewer, people should have a stake in the income tax system. But that is my personal view, and I accept that there are countervailing arguments. For instance, lifting the threshold reduces the pressure on tax credits. I recognise that it is an interesting political debate.
Setting rates and bands without being able to set thresholds makes no sense. Of course, raising thresholds and personal allowances is dramatic and expensive, which is presumably why the Scottish Parliament is being denied the power, but leaving aside the need for and desirability of full control, does not full fiscal autonomy lead to full fiscal responsibility? The more autonomy a Parliament is given, the more responsible it becomes. Countries such as Belgium and Spain—not without their own separatist problems—provide exceptionally broad autonomy to their constituent parts.
That is certainly the case in the United States, where the states have full fiscal autonomy, including the power to issue bonds and the like—the whole lot, as far as I know. This country is definitely not the United States, despite the best efforts of Mr Blair, but if there is one aspect of America we should like to emulate, it is its vigorous civic culture. Its states, counties and towns have real power and the capability to respond to people’s needs and democratic desires. Surely we all want Scotland to have that capacity, just as we want the whole UK to have it. The fact that fiddling with thresholds is so expensive makes Governments and Parliaments niggardly about raising them—each £100 is inordinately expensive—but why should the Scottish Parliament be less responsible than the UK Parliament? Can anybody tell me why a responsible Scottish Parliament should not also be niggardly about that power and use it in a very conservative—small c—way?
Of course, full fiscal autonomy requires a set of support mechanisms through a formula-based grant. That should be based on need, not obscure variations on English spending, which is why I am opposed to the Barnett formula and want to replace it with one based on need—but that is a debate for another time. If the UK Parliament issued a sensible grant formula based on the specific needs of the Scottish Parliament, and if that were followed by full freedom for the latter to set personal allowances, bands and rates, I believe the Scottish Parliament would use that power responsibly and carefully. I contend that the more power we give the Scottish Parliament, the less it will be a grievance Parliament and the more the forces of canny, prudent Scottish financial conservatism will be unleashed. Indeed, the best way to encourage the growth of the Conservative party in Scotland is to give the Scottish Parliament more power. At the moment, all the pressure on it is to spend more money and blame the UK Government when we indulge in any austerity programme.
In the current situation, it is perfectly logical for the voters to choose whichever party complains the most and makes the biggest fuss. I do not blame the Scottish people for doing that. The current system leads to that sort of mindset, whereas the UK system leads to an alternative mindset—we want politicians in power who are careful about how they vary thresholds and bands. It is because Treasury Ministers have that power that people are careful about whom they elect, and Conservatives do not do too badly in that UK set-up.
With full home rule and full fiscal autonomy, the voter would be in charge and would choose representatives who would raise and spend money wisely rather than just go cap in hand to Westminster. That is surely what we want to achieve, so what is the objection? If it is said that the Barnett formula makes such natural freedom unobtainable, the solution is not the denial of power or freedom but the end of the formula. If the argument is that the Scottish tax system could undermine full UK fiscal responsibility, I find it unconvincing. For instance, the Scottish Parliament spends £37 billion and raises £30 billion—quite responsible, actually. The UK spends £732 billion and raises £648 billion. [Interruption.] I thought Scottish National party Members would respond in that way, but I could not resist helping them along.
The serious point that I am making is that the Scottish budget is very small compared with the UK budget. If we gave the Scottish Parliament full fiscal responsibility, it is extremely unlikely that it would upset our fiscal responsibility. The Secretary of State may, of course, be able to deal with that point. He has many more expert advisers than I do, and I will listen to the arguments that are made today and wait for his response. Perhaps he will indulge me, if not with a yes to my arguments then at least with a willingness to listen and, in time, to move. If he is not interested, we could return to the matter on Report.
I make my comments in the spirit of trying to be creative and helpful. We can return to these matters, but I hope that the Secretary of State will not just provide a throwaway line from the civil service brief but will try to respond to the arguments that are made. We are trying to create a responsible Parliament; let us give it full fiscal autonomy.