It is always a pleasure—nay, an honour—to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg), who speaks with vigour and all the colour that we have come to expect from him. Those of us who have known him since long before 2010 know that he is characteristically forthright on these issues. Whether he is absolutely right on them is another matter, however, and it is to the issue about which he has rightly expressed concern today that I now turn, bearing in mind the time remaining and the need for other speakers to make their contributions.
Yes, the opt-ins do involve some concession of sovereignty. To try and deny that would be wholly wrong. The issue, therefore, is one of competence and the extent to which the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg determines issues that fall to be decided as to the interpretation and operation of the measures, subject to the opt-in. On that, to some degree I share some of the concerns raised by my hon. Friends on the Conservative Benches.
I am an opponent of judicial activism. As a politician who is philosophically of the centre-right, I do not believe that it is for judges to interpret treaties and other documents as living instruments which adapt according to their view of the world at any one time. We see that problem in the Court at Strasbourg and the Court in Luxembourg, but we also see that problem in the courts here in London, here in England, here in Wales, here in Scotland. This is not an issue that is particular to Europe and its institutions. That is a very important point when we remember the nature and scale of the task before us, because, to my mind, this is not a debate between Westminster and Brussels or Luxembourg; this is a debate about whether it is legislators—politicians—who ultimately determine the extent and ambit of our laws, or whether, as increasingly is the case, our laws are interpreted in different ways by judges.
The old certainty of politicians passing and enacting the laws and judges implementing them and making determinations on a case-by-case basis gets more blurred
with the passage of the years, and that worries me, as a Conservative, and I know it worries all my fellow Conservatives. I know it worries my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor. We discussed the matter only yesterday in the Justice Committee, and he made some very wise interventions about his concerns about judicial activism.
Therefore, I thoroughly understand and embrace the concerns that are being expressed by my hon. Friends. What I take issue with them on is this: the full extent to which the European Court of Justice will have jurisdiction upon the general run of justice and home affairs in this country. I accept that on the opt-out issues it will have jurisdiction, and there are dangers that, as we have seen with other interpretations—for example, of the free movement directive—there could be judicial creep and an extension beyond the original intentions of those who framed the directives we are talking about. But when it comes to the fundamentals of English and Welsh justice, I see no threat to the long-established traditions, customs, laws and practices that we have in our criminal courts. I see no threat to the principle of trial by jury. I see no threat to the inferences that are to be drawn from the exercise by suspects of their right to silence.
We have had debates on these things. I recall going with my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Justice Committee to Brussels to discuss a directive, which is now coming to the fore, about the inferences to be drawn from the exercise by the accused of the right to silence when arrested. We had a lively discussion in the justice directorate-general about the inappropriateness of that particular directive in its application to the criminal law of England and Wales. That sort of detailed case-by-case, directive-by-directive discussion will be the surest safeguard against the general creep that my hon. Friends and others fear.