I follow the Secretary of State, the shadow Secretary of State and others in paying tribute to those brave young men who have just lost their lives in the hills of the Brecon Beacons. My thoughts and prayers are with their families, as I am sure are those of the whole House. I remember some uncomfortable times there many years ago.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard). He and I work together closely on the Select Committee. I associate myself with his tribute to the mountain rescue service in his constituency. We must not prejudge the inquiry, but I hope its role in averting a much worse problem will be fully acknowledged.
Let me be very clear that I strongly support the Bill and I am delighted that the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), will be taking it through Committee—if I am very lucky, perhaps I will be allowed to serve on it. I support almost all the Bill’s provisions. I just want to say a few words on procurement before focusing mostly on part 3.
I am happy that we are evaluating the possibility of a GoCo. There are a number of very successful GoCos in our current set-up, including Aldermaston and the special arrangements that Babcock has with the Royal Navy. However, to echo what my hon. Friend the Member for
Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) said, there is one feature of the GoCo that I am very concerned about: the possibility that there might be a substantial foreign element in its running. My reason for saying that is not xenophobic at all. There are two main reasons why there should be a serious concern about foreign companies or foreign employees being involved in the management company: one relates to intellectual property rights—state secrets—and the other relates to reasons of commercial confidentiality.
Many years ago, just before I was elected to Parliament, I did a consulting project in Aldermaston for the management of a small Swedish firm that I was working for at the time. I cannot see how the commercially in confidence question could possibly arise in Aldermaston with regard to the American companies involved in the management. It simply is not an issue. The point about IPR is that we are already collaborating with the Americans and, arguably, they are pretty uniformly ahead of us; so the IPR reason does not arise, because there is no parallel.
The plain fact is that if we were to employ foreigners in a management company, whether or not they work for foreign companies, there is a danger that they might then be cherry-picked. Even if we put the clear criminal sanctions set out in part 2 of the Bill into part 1—slightly oddly, they are in part 2 but not in part 1—there would be no way of enforcing them if, for example, an American employee of an American company was then head-hunted by one of the big American defence contractors so that it could pick his brains on commercially confidential material.