That is a kind offer from the Secretary of State, although he could have done so off his own back, and the problem is that we are running out of time for named day questions and replies. The alternative, with his permission, would be for me simply to tweet his letter. That would be quicker and I would be happy to do so if he so wishes. [Interruption.] With the Secretary of State’s permission, I will now tweet the letter I received some months ago detailing the Government’s response to The Sunday Times revelations.
These issues, alongside the impact of any reform of our strategic and working relationships with major international partners, particularly the US, and providing clarity on the ownership of risk, will be priorities for the Opposition. The restructuring of DE&S, however, should also be seen as part of a wider structural reform of defence procurement.
There is much else that I could have said, but time is against us today and my colleagues will raise in Committee additional points about sovereign capabilities, long-term planning and predictability for British industry, so I shall now turn briefly to reform of the reserves.
The Opposition want to ensure that reservist recruitment is successful so that the reserves can work alongside regulars to project force globally. Our reservists make an enormous contribution here at home in many ways. About 2,000 of them, some of whom I saw for myself
when I went to see the Greco-Roman wrestling, helped to protect the London Olympics. Many serve overseas in far-away terrain in the name of national security. We should pay tribute to each one of those who have served, and above all to those who have lost their lives serving our nation.
While we champion the reserve force, we recognise the need to modernise. The name change to “Army Reserve” will reflect a modern composition and hopefully help to attract a new generation of recruits. The task ahead is, however, enormous and we should not pretend otherwise. The plan to double the size of the reserve forces to 30,000 by 2018 is now central to the Government’s ability to deliver their planning assumptions—originally, of course, designed for an Army of 95,000, but after further cuts now reliant on a regular force of just 82,000.
The scale of this task is underlined if we consider that the reserve forces of the US, Canada and Australia make up between 40% and 50% of their armies, as opposed to 20% here in the UK. Many analysts worry that, rather than reform of the Army being synchronised with that of the reserves, both are disjointed and the reserve uplift will not complement the regular Army but supplement lost capacity. Cuts in the regular Army are happening regardless of the success of any uplift in the reserves, rather than the one being contingent on the other.
This development comes as Army reserve recruitment has hit real trouble. The figures are publicly available—that recruitment targets were missed by more than 4,000 last year. Great care has to be taken to ensure that the loss of 26 Territorial Army centres does not make civilian communities in certain areas more disconnected from the military and disinclined to volunteer for the reserves.