I would have thought that before the Government considered a sale they would decide what they want to sell and what they do not want to sell. I do not think that what the hon. Gentleman suggests should be a particular problem, particularly given the taxpayer interests involved, in terms of having that report before a sale. However, I accept that there could be circumstances in which commercial confidentiality might apply and a line might need to be considered. I would be happy to examine whether some aspects of that need to be built into this concept. There is an opacity about the Government’s strategy, and the fog engulfing the Treasury, perhaps hiding the chaos within, is extremely thick—a real pea-souper. I am amazed that once the Chancellor
of the Exchequer had defenestrated the chief executive of RBS—let us be honest, that is essentially what happened, and although the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have protested, “It’s nothing to do with me, guv,” with his 82% shareholding he clearly had a hand in the decision —the Government were surprised when the markets reacted so adversely. It is amazing that they went down that route without thinking through who would replace Stephen Hester as chief executive of RBS, creating a massive amount of uncertainty about the future of the institution. We are glad that they changed their minds and were forced to back down from the rush to the fire sale, but what on earth are we left with and where is the situation going?
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The commission managed to eke out of the Government a vague commitment that they would consider the good bank/bad bank issue, possibly in September. We need the Minister to elaborate on that commitment today, and it is very important we get that. Why have the Government ruled out some of the other considerations needed at this time? The Chancellor, itching as ever to achieve his political ends, has turned his focus on Lloyds and getting that stake out of the door. It might be easier to do that with Lloyds, but we need some reassurance that the taxpayers’ best interests will come first, not the political game playing and political timetable—whether it is about the timing of the general election or something else—that is driving the process. It should be done in the best interests of the economy and of the taxpayer.
Apparently sovereign wealth funds—in other words, other countries—might well buy stakes in Lloyds and British banks. I am told that apparently LIBOR will be run by the New York stock exchange, so there is a theme developing of other countries getting involved in historically British institutions. I will leave that issue to one side, however. I merely want us to have a clear and comprehensive strategy not just on better competition for the banking sector but so that the Chancellor can prove that he is adept at thinking through properly what to do with the Government’s stake—the taxpayers’ stake—in these institutions. They are fundamental to the British economy; they are massive institutions with a great footprint on our economy and worldwide. That is why we feel that new clause 10 is the least we should have—we should have that level of reporting, of availability of information and of options appraisal. We need a comprehensive assessment that is evidence-led and considers all options. That is an important matter of principle as, ultimately, this must be all about getting best value for the taxpayer.