There is considerable force in what my right hon. Friend says. We considered the issue in great depth and published a report—the third report—on exactly that. We discussed the case for full separation, but concluded that although the ring-fence proposals had merit, they should not be reconsidered until we have given the Vickers ring-fence approach a try. We also examined the merits of a closely related proposal for the separation of proprietary trading—exactly what is being suggested—from the rest of banking activity. We concluded that further statutory support was not needed for that approach now, because the Prudential Regulation Authority might already have the powers to implement an effective separation of prop trading. We asked the PRA to present a report to the Treasury and to Parliament on its use of a range of monitoring and corrective actions, which could serve as the subsequent basis for a full and independent review of the case for full separation of prop trading. Unfortunately, as far as I can tell—I have had very little time to absorb this publication, which came out only at 12.30 pm—the Government have rejected even examining the proposal for prop trading. That is a mistake. I regret that, but I hope it will be put right in the other place.
Returning to amendment (a), the Government accepted the case for ring-fencing, arguing that banks that test the ring fence should be strongly deterred and, if necessary, prevented from doing so. However, I am afraid that that will not be the effect of the Government’s amendments. On the contrary, the Government amendments almost guarantee that banks will not get a shock, and will not be discouraged from testing or gaming the ring fence. The regulator needs a useable and credible deterrent. This proposal creates too many obstacles and delays to the sanction of full separation.
Frankly, it is inadequate for three main reasons. First, it requires the regulator to issue—we have already heard a little about this—no fewer than three preliminary notices and a warning notice before it can act. Secondly, it then requires the regulator to obtain permission from the Treasury no fewer than three times while the process is in train. Putting that requirement on the statute book would transfer most of the effective regulatory decision-making power away from the PRA and the Bank of England to the Treasury. It cannot be appropriate for the Treasury to be the regulator. The commission argued for a Treasury override at the end of the process, not at the beginning or in the middle, but the Government’s amendment requires the regulator to secure the consent of the Treasury on three occasions prior to that point. Even so-called preliminary notices—in effect, expressions of concern by the regulator—will require Treasury consent. That is absurd and compromises the regulator’s independence.
The third objection has also been alluded to. The Government’s amendments allow at least five years for the completion of the separation after a decision has been made. That would create enormous scope—indeed, it would make it ideal—for lobbying for a change of heart in the interim. It would create far too much room for that and we can do without it. It also flies in the face of what the Minister said in Committee, where he alerted Parliament to the risk of what he described as an “inordinately long” delay in implementation. A tool that is so difficult and slow to use is likely to deter no one and that is why I have proposed a number of amendments that would remove some of the obstacles erected by the Government to taking action to separate banks.