UK Parliament / Open data

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

The hon. Gentleman gets to the nub of the matter, because of course any attempt to evade the ring fence or to nibble the electric fence, as dangerous to health as that would be, could be undertaken only on the part of a particular institution, not the system. That is why we agreed with the Commission’s report—it was not part of the Vickers report—that it was necessary, for exactly the reasons the hon. Gentleman mentions, to have a sanction against that type of behaviour, and that is what we have done.

A further power to separate the whole system could not be triggered by an individual and could not punish the actions of an individual institution. That is why I think that is a very different policy. It commands the support of some very distinguished and influential people. The Glass–Steagall approach, which of course the policy is modelled on, has its place in history, but I think that history also reveals that the Glass–Steagall arrangements were not immune to the very dangers my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) pointed to. It is a good job my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester secured his amendment to the programme motion, because we are having a very interesting debate, but I would like to conclude, because there are other amendments that hon. Members would like to speak to. On that point, however, I urge the House not to allow at this stage the introduction of a very different policy into the Bill.

Let me turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester, who I dare say will speak for himself in a few moments. I know that some of them were tabled to afford us the opportunity to discuss his Commission’s report, and I think that this is now established as a very relevant opportunity. I will of course listen carefully to what he says. I am confident that the amendment the Government have tabled in response to the Commission’s report can be improved during the Bill’s passage to take into account whatever concerns are embodied in his amendments.

Amendment (a) to Government amendment 6 would add a new condition under which the separation powers could be used: namely, when the regulator

“judges that there are serious failings in the culture and standards of the ring-fenced body or another member of its group.”

Of course, under the Government’s amendment the regulator would have the ability to separate the group if its conduct threatened to undermine the regulator’s ability to meet its continuity objective, but I think that, as the commission’s extensive deliberations showed, cultural failings might be present in banks that can result, for example, in significant harm to individual consumers or groups of consumers but nevertheless do not have systemic consequences. I think that the relevance of the proposed new power to take into account the culture is adequately covered under the provisions already in the Bill.

Amendments (b) to (p) concern the procedures for exercising the separation power. They would remove from the process: the second and third preliminary notice stages that extend to six weeks the time for banks to make representations; the requirement that the group be given a minimum of five years to effect separation; and the requirement for Treasury consent before a group can be required to separate. It is, of course, essential that a clear process be established for the exercise of the separation power. As I have said, I will listen carefully to what my hon. Friend says about reducing the number of warnings, which I think is the essence of what he is recommending, and about departing from the standard practice in financial services of allowing 14 days, rather than the six weeks that he proposes, for representations.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

566 cc67-8 

Session

2013-14

Chamber / Committee

House of Commons chamber
Back to top