Protection of Freedoms Bill

The amendments relate to the provisions in parts 1 to 4 of the Bill. Some are of a minor and technical nature, but some are of more substance; given the number of amendments in the group, I propose to focus my comments on the more substantive amendments. We are returning to themes and issues that have been debated at length in the House. Obviously, we judge that improvements have been made in the other place. We very much look forward to debating those issues, as well as the amendments to the Lords amendments proposed by the Opposition. Amendment 1 takes account of the change in part 5 of the Bill to the definition of ““vulnerability””. The new definition is intended to be more straightforward for the police to understand and apply. It relates to the ability of the police to retain the DNA profile of someone who has been arrested but not necessarily charged, and to a measure built in to provide certain safeguards where there was some proximity between the person arrested and the possible victim of a crime. Part of that relies on the definition of ““vulnerable adult””. The definition originally applied in clause 3 was taken from the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. As that Act and definition are amended by the Bill, the 2006 Act definition is no longer suitable because it focuses on the care or treatment being provided to the individual, rather than on the characteristics of the person themselves. For the purposes of clause 3, a different definition is needed, which is why we have imported the definition from the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which links vulnerability to the ability of an individual to protect themselves from violence, abuse or neglect, and which we feel fits more neatly the purposes of clause 3. As I have said, the provision is intended to provide a further safeguard where the police arrest someone for a violent or sexual offence, if there is proximity to the victim. Amendment 2 introduces a limited exception to the general rule, brought forward from the previous Government's Crime and Security Act 2010, that all samples will be destroyed within six months of being taken. I think both sides of the House agree that DNA samples should be destroyed as soon as practicable, and a six-month window was felt to be appropriate. However, the Government tabled amendment 2 in the other place in response to representations from prosecutors at the Crown Prosecution Service. They told us that, in a limited number of cases each year, it would be necessary to retain individual samples in order to deal with any subsequent challenge by the defence to the comparison made between the DNA of the individual and that found at the crime scene—in other words, to provide reassurance in relation to criminal prosecution. Prosecutors expressed concerns that if they could not retain samples in these cases, they might unable to withstand such a challenge and that acquittals on technical grounds might result. It might assist right hon. and hon. Members if I give an example of the type of case where such an issue might arise. A crime scene stain could well contain a mixture of the blood of both a stabbing victim and their attacker, and perhaps a third person such as an innocent house-mate of the victim. In such case, the quantity of material from the victim is likely to exceed significantly that from the attacker and the innocent third party. Without retaining the reference samples from all three individuals, the chemistry and analysis used to derive the three individual profiles, and thus make a match to the suspect, might be open to challenge in court. Lords amendment 2 therefore creates a safeguard by inserting a mechanism into clause 14 to enable the police to decide very early in a case, before any samples have been destroyed, to make an application to the local magistrates court to retain all the individual samples in the case for 12 months. In the majority of cases, 12 months should be long enough to identify a suspect and complete the pre-trial disclosure process, as part of which it would be established whether the defence intended to mount a challenge to the derivation of the DNA profiles and/or the matches that may have arisen; if not, the material would be destroyed at that point. If the derivation of the profiles remained at issue, a further application could be made to the trial judge to retain the material for an additional 12 months. Lords amendment 3 updates the existing exclusions from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to ensure that the new regime in part 1 of the Bill does not apply to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 or the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, both of which have bespoke retention and destruction regimes in schedule 1 to the Bill. In case the shadow Policing Minister is wondering, I will come to the Opposition's amendment (a) to Lords amendment 3, but I will go through the Government's amendments before dealing with to the Opposition amendments. Lords amendments 73 to 83 to part 3 of schedule 1, relate to the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints as set out in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, as opposed to those that fall under standard PACE regimes. Specifically, amendment 73 ensures that new section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act applies only to biometric material that is held by a law enforcement authority under the law of England, Wales or Northern Ireland, that is not subject to existing statutory restrictions, and that is held for the purposes of national security. The remaining amendments also clarify the scope of the application of the provisions amending the retention regime under section 18 of the 2008 Act. They extend the list of existing statutory restrictions set out in the Act and permit law enforcement authorities to retain anonymous material indefinitely. The amendments would essentially prevent the premature deletion of profiles, before a proper investigation into who the sample belongs to has taken place. The separate issue of biometrics in schools is dealt with by Lords amendments 7 to 14. The Government consider a child's biometric information to be highly personal and sensitive, and as such, it should be afforded greater protection. We debated these issues at length in Committee during the Bill's earlier passage through this House. There is general agreement in both Houses that schools and colleges should be required to obtain the consent of a child's parents if they wish to take and process a child's biometric information. We listened carefully to the concerns raised about how the proposal to seek the written consent of each parent would impose an unreasonable additional burden on schools and colleges, and that it could discourage schools and colleges from using biometric recognition technology. Lords amendments 7 to 14 would remove the requirement for both parents to give consent, and provide instead for schools and colleges to be required to notify both parents that they intend to take and process the child's biometric information. As long as no parent objects in writing, the written consent of only one parent will suffice. We believe that Lords amendments 7 to 14 strike a sensible balance between ensuring that the views of both parents continue to be taken into account and preserving their right to object, as well as ensuring that the administrative burden on schools and colleges is not too great. The amendments also bring the consent requirements in the Bill more in line with all the other forms of consent that schools and colleges are required to have. The main difference in this instance is the express provision to notify both parents of a child, and the stipulation that if any parent objects, the processing of their child's biometric information cannot take place. The amendments in no way lessen the key purpose of this part of the Bill, which is to ensure that children's personal and sensitive data are properly protected. The amendments to part 4 of the Bill relate to pre-charge detention. Lords amendment 27, which is a response to a further recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, relates to clause 58, which contains a power for the Secretary of State to increase the maximum limit of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects to 28 days for a three-month period in circumstances where Parliament is dissolved or in the period before the first Queen's Speech of the new Parliament. The Committee previously considered a similar order-making power in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. That Act contains a duty for an order made when Parliament is not sitting to be laid as soon as practicable afterwards. To ensure consistency across these two pieces of legislation, and in keeping with the Committee's recommendation, Lords amendment 27 requires a draft of a clause 58 order to be laid before Parliament once it has reassembled following a general election. Lords amendment 28 is designed also to respond to an observation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee by removing any requirement for an order that revokes a 28-day pre-charge detention extension to be approved by Parliament. The extension by order of pre-charge detention to 28 days would be exceptional, as we have said previously; therefore revoking the order would simply return the pre-charge detention arrangements to the status quo. Lords amendments 29 and 101 are a response to a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights on stop-and-search powers. The purpose of the amendments is to ensure that the police officer who is considering whether to authorise the use of stop-and-search powers under section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000 is reasonable in his or her consideration of the necessity of using the powers, as well as in his or her suspicion that an act of terrorism will take place. The Government believe that the amendments made in the other place have improved the relevant provisions of the Bill, and I commend them to the House. Let me turn to the Opposition amendments in the group, starting with amendment (a) to Lords amendment 3. On our reading, it would effectively disapply all the substantive provisions of chapter 1 of part 1 of the Bill in cases of an alleged offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. In practice, if a person was arrested for, or charged with, any offence under the 2003 Act, there would be no requirement to destroy DNA samples and no time limit on the retention of DNA profiles or fingerprints. It is interesting that, with amendment (a), Labour appears to be changing the position it held in government, when Ministers appeared to argue that a six-year limit was appropriate. They also said that they acknowledged the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the S and Marper case, and their proposals in the Crime and Security Act 2010 were intended to follow through on that. When the Bill was last before this House, we discussed at some length whether it was appropriate to retain such material for three or six years. Now the Opposition apparently wish to ignore even their own previous analysis, and instead go back to keeping everything for ever in cases involving offences under the 2003 Act. Before, when we challenged the Opposition on this, they said, ““No, no, it is not our intention to keep DNA profiles for ever. We wish to stick rigidly to the six-year rule,”” so it is interesting—and notable, given their statements that they are now moving more in the direction of protecting individual liberty—that they are now reverting to type and seeking to retain indefinitely the DNA profile of people who might be innocent of any crime. As I have said, we have already discussed this matter at great length and looked at the analysis that has been undertaken. The Information Commissioner, when considering the analysis of the previous Government, said that that analysis did not support a period of anything like six years. If that is the case, how can it support indefinite retention? I will certainly listen carefully to the Opposition's explanation of why they have fundamentally changed their position since we last debated these matters. Under the provisions of the Bill, those charged with a qualifying offence, including rape, will have their DNA held for three years, and the police will be able to apply to the courts to extend that by a further two years. Those arrested for a qualifying offence but not charged, where the victim is vulnerable, will also have their DNA held for three years, subject to the approval of the new independent commissioner. We considered this provision carefully in the light of the fact that these cases are often very sensitive, and we judged that the protection afforded by the Bill is appropriate and proportionate. If six years was too long, how on earth do the Opposition justify indefinite retention? The previous Government's proposals received virtually no external backing in the light of that inconsistency. In setting what we feel is a more appropriate retention period for those who have not been convicted, we responded to the concerns expressed about putting the right people on the DNA database—about 1.2 million people who have not been convicted of any offence are on the database—but we also thought it appropriate to do more about the people who have been convicted of an offence, sometimes a serious one, but whose DNA profiles are not on the database. That is why we encouraged the police to complete Operation Sheen, which identified more than 300 subjects in prison custody who had been convicted of murder, manslaughter or a sex offence but whose DNA profile did not appear to be recorded on the national database. I am pleased to tell the House that that operation has recently been completed, and that it has resulted in an additional 376 such individuals having their DNA taken and uploaded to the database. Having completed that work, and using the provisions of the Crime and Security Act 2010, which was passed in the final days of the previous Parliament, the police service has embarked upon Operation Nutmeg, which seeks to trace and sample those with similar convictions who are now in the community. We believe that our proposals represent an appropriate balance between the rights of those who have not been convicted by a court and the need to protect the public in some of the most difficult cases. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to oppose amendment (a) to Lords amendment 3 in the strongest possible terms. Amendment (a) to Lords amendment 9 would provide that a school or college could process a child's data if at least one parent has consented or no parent has objected. I will listen carefully to the Opposition's arguments for this amendment. It appears to us that they want to move to an opt-out regime, rather than the opt-in approach provided by the Bill. That might be a misinterpretation of their amendment, so I shall listen carefully to what the shadow Minister has to say. As we have previously made clear, we do not believe that an opt-out approach would do enough to protect the rights of parents and pupils in relation to the child's biometric data, because such information is highly personal and sensitive.