Protection of Freedoms Bill

My Lords, as I explained, because we looked at the evidence we did indeed bring it down to six years. If the noble Lord looked at that evidence it would show that six years is the appropriate amount of time for DNA evidence to be kept. Following the election, based on no new evidence, the Government announced that they would legislate to adopt the protections of the Scottish model. It was based on no evidence but was simply a judgment of the appropriate balance. A review of the Scottish system by Professor Fraser one year after it was introduced assessed the success only of the current system and did not compare whether a longer retention period would be beneficial or whether retention for three years was detrimental to solving serious crimes. The Government persist in seeking to apply the Scottish model in England and Wales when all the evidence and strong police advice from both sides of the border is that Scotland should instead apply the model of England and Wales. Scotland’s rape conviction rate is less than half that of England and Wales. The DNA database in Scotland is far less effective in solving crime than that in England and Wales. In 2009-10 a DNA profile loaded on to the DNA database in England and Wales had an 18 per cent higher chance of finding a match than was the case in Scotland. That is evidence that our system in England and Wales is far preferable and much more efficient and effective than the system in Scotland. The Home Office hazard assessment shows that the risk of an individual who has been arrested and/or charged with a serious offence being rearrested remains above the national average well beyond three years. I am sure that the Government will argue that the Home Office hazard curve dips after three years and that the majority of risk reduction occurs within that time. However, there is a significant tail beyond three years. The Home Affairs Committee was concerned that the Home Office report looked at the risk of rearrest rather than reoffending after an original arrest, but accepted the data for want of better. The Home Office only had usable data for a maximum period of three years from the police national computer and thus had to extrapolate beyond that period. The Home Affairs Committee questioned the evidence base beyond three years and stated that, "““it is not certain that either the extrapolation or the estimate is correct, so it is not certain that six years is really where the difference in probability reduces to a minimum: the timescale could be longer, it could be shorter””." The committee concluded that, "““given the complexity of the issues and the conflicting evidence about what would be an appropriate length of time for retention, we are unable to recommend a specific period other than to say that we would regard three years as the minimum length of time for which such profiles should be retained””." Rather than destroy a vital bank of data that can never be retrieved on the basis of no new evidence, will the Government not agree to undertake a proper assessment to ascertain the right limits and the true risks to public safety? Evidence shows that the effect of destroying the database and reducing retention would be that 23,000 criminals a year who will no longer be on the database could commit 6,000 further crimes. This research was not published by the Government when the Bill was produced. In its evidence to the Public Bill Committee, ACPO estimated that the proposed changes would lead to a loss of about 1,000 successful—