Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, three amendments are tabled in this group in my name and those of my noble friends. They are principally probing in nature on some important points that need clarification. Amendment 136 would leave out the duty on the board in respect of the variation of the provision of health services; while Amendment 268 would leave out the instruction that: "““Monitor must not exercise its functions for the purpose of causing a variation in the proportion of health care services””;" while the third element of the group seeks that Clause 144 should not stand part. This clause relates to the: "““Secretary of State’s duty as respects variation in provision of health services””." It would seem that this group of provisions provide the Secretary of State, Monitor or the NHS Commissioning Board with the ability to increase or decrease the share of market for the provision of health services held by a particular group of providers. I assume that this also applies to CCGs, but I would be grateful to the noble Earl if he could explain whether that is the case. I would also be grateful if he could say how these will impact on the provision of primary medical services and the contracting for them by the NHS Commissioning Board. Can he further say how this will affect the commissioning of services by CCGs when they propose to commission services either from hospitals, other primary care providers or private sector hospitals? I suppose that what we are seeking is clarification of the definition of ““providers””. For example, let us say that a strategic decision was made by a clinical commissioning group to switch priority from secondary care to community care and that it was a deliberate decision to increase or decrease the share in the market by a particular group of providers, what would be the implications of that for other providers? We also need to think about the issues of cherry-picking that have been mentioned. This clause was added with a certain amount of fanfare as the Government’s response to the Future Forum and attracted claims of victory by the Liberal Democrats over the threat of privatisation. I give them credit for trying to protect the NHS from the full force of the then draft Bill. But the reason why we want to explore these provisions is that we are concerned that they will not achieve what has been claimed for them. As with so many concessions, you need to scratch beneath the surface to see whether they actually achieve what you want from them. First, are these provisions effective in achieving the aim of preventing the overt promotion of private companies in the National Health Service? The impact assessment of the Bill still states that the aim is to promote a so-called ““fair playing field””, and it goes on to say that, ““An important way of making the market work will be to rebalance so-called fair playing field distortions””, citing a report which calculated that the NHS enjoys a £14 cost advantage over the private sector for every £100 it spends. We know that at present around 3 per cent of NHS funding is spent on the private sector. This is also taken as an indicator of an unfair playing field for private providers. Therefore, in order to achieve parity between the sectors, the Bill requires that all CCGs, Monitor and the Secretary of State should provide extra subsidies to the private sector, and to promote it so that it does have parity. If this does not happen then, according to the Government’s own impact assessments, these reforms will fail. We also know that other words and actions from the Government suggest that the promotion of the private sector is continuing unabated. The noble Earl himself reportedly told a private health company conference that the reforms offer huge opportunities for the private sector. Most recently, we have had the continuing agenda confirmed by an operating framework that sets out both the agenda for the commercialisation of commissioning support, which is a deliberate policy to remove commissioning from the public sector, and the announcement of a performance measure of the trend in value/volume of patients being treated at non-NHS hospitals. On this side of the House we are unconvinced that this intention has gone out of the Bill and remain concerned that the long-term aim of using competition law and the market to provide a wedge for privatisation has not been removed. I ask the Liberal Democrats to look at these questions very carefully. On this side of the House we question this clause because we do not think the NHS can—or should—be blind to the governance and ownership of its providers. We think it is right that the Secretary of State should be able to say that the NHS is the preferred provider in certain situations, particularly where existing services are performing well through performance management, collaboration and professional motivation. It may be desirable for a commissioner to maintain continuity of emergency and critical care services that are not amenable to the open market and in order to do so it may need to manage the system of providers locally. We are learning the hard way from Southern Cross what happens when commissioners turn a blind eye to the governance and business models of providers of social care. We should not be afraid of saying that organisations with a social purpose should sometimes be promoted above those driven by narrow financial interests. That is not about preserving the world the way it is, or perhaps once was. We think this clause could actively prevent policies that this side supports and which have been promoted in Government, including the right for NHS staff to request to set up a mutual social enterprise—we will be discussing that in a later group of amendments—with support to do so and protections from well-financed bids from multinational companies. We understood that the parties opposite supported these aims as well, but in supporting this clause they may show to the third sector that they will have no more assistance in development from this Secretary of State. It is worth noting that while the amendment was introduced following the Future Forum, Peers will have received a briefing from ACEVO whose chief executive chaired the choice and competition strand of the Future Forum exercise. Therefore, my final remarks are from that briefing. This is what ACEVO has said: "““We believe that the unintended consequences of the Government’s policy to ‘outlaw any policy to increase the market share of any particular sector or provider’ would be that people in the NHS Commissioning Board and NHS more widely would interpret the Health and Social Care Bill to mean that capacity building and other policies which support the development of voluntary and community organisations would become illegal””." It goes on to say that this would have the unintended consequences of: "““Stymying various Government policies, from building the capacity of charities and community groups to supporting public sector staff to form new mutuals/social enterprises (the Department of Health previously said it wanted to ‘create the largest and most vibrant social enterprise sector in the world’ … Making it harder for charities and community groups to provide services and support that many (particularly those who are vulnerable and hard to reach) rely on””." This is a very serious probing amendment. Between now and Report it is going to be very important that all those organisations and parties who think that they have solved the problem, consider that they may, in fact, have made the situation worse. I beg to move.