Health and Social Care Bill

My Lords, as my noble friend the Minister points out, the autonomy clauses are to form part of the Government’s discussions with other noble Lords about the Secretary of State’s duties. These clauses are of considerable significance. In my judgment, Clause 4, relating to the Secretary of State’s duty, and the new Section 13F, relating to the Commissioning Board, threaten the Secretary of State’s primary duty to secure provision of services, however that is ultimately worded after discussions are concluded. In principle, promoting autonomy is to be welcomed; so is avoiding micromanagement within the NHS, as my noble friend Lady Cumberlege so eloquently pointed out in her speech. One of the best features of this Bill is that it establishes a well-defined decentralised structure in which decisions about arranging and commissioning services are made at a local level in accordance with local needs and conditions. However, as the Government have recognised, it is also essential that final responsibility, both for the quality of the health service and for the very large sums of taxpayers' money spent in providing it, should rest with the Secretary of State, and that he or she should be accountable not only to Parliament for the exercise of that responsibility but answerable in the courts for failure to exercise it in accordance with the law. I will say a few words now about how the difficulty arises in drafting provisions that strike the right balance between decentralisation and the Secretary of State’s ultimate responsibility. As we all know, under Section 1(2) of the National Health Act 2006, the Secretary of State had a primary duty to, "““provide or secure the provision of services””." That was underpinned by a direct duty under Section 3 to provide a list of specific services such as hospital accommodation. That duty was in turn supplemented and buttressed by powers under Sections 7 and 8 to delegate and give directions to other NHS bodies. So there was under the 2006 legislation a simple linear structure down from the Secretary of State. Under the Bill, the position is more complex, because under Clause 10 the Section 3 duty to provide the specific services is devolved to the clinical commissioning groups, and the general powers to delegate and give directions are removed. That is why it is challenging to provide for an overarching duty on the Secretary of State to secure the provision of services under Clause 1, and to provide for the exercise of all his other functions to that end. It is that challenge that is principally to be the subject of discussions. If the Secretary of State is bound by a duty to promote autonomy, as proposed in Clause 4, the force of his duty to secure provision of services is weakened, because his failure to intervene in any given case would be very difficult to challenge on judicial review, except in an extreme case. Generally, the Secretary of State could respond to any challenge regarding a failure to act on his part by claiming in his defence that he was declining to act pursuant to his duty to promote autonomy. It does not help that the Secretary of State would only be bound to promote autonomy, "““so far as is consistent with the interests of the health service””," in the context of any such challenge. That is because the arbiter of what those interests were would be the Secretary of State himself. A court would not substitute its own view of the interests of the health service for his unless it was satisfied that his view was irrational; and that is too high a bar. It follows, in my view, that there is an inconsistency between the proposed duties to promote autonomy and fulfilment of the Secretary of State's overall responsibility, however it is to be expressed. The problem with proposed new Section 13F is that it is proposed that the board, with regard to its autonomy provision, be similarly bound to promote the autonomy of the commissioning bodies and others. So the board can argue that it should decline to intervene with the commissioning bodies in accordance with its duty to promote autonomy. That could be relevant if the board were challenged by judicial review on its failure to exercise its intervention powers or, alternatively, relevant if the Secretary of State wished to exercise his powers in respect of the board on the board's failure to intervene where the Secretary of State thought that the board ought to intervene. Thus, while it is desirable— and I entirely agree that it is—for the chain of responsibility to allow plenty of slack as a general rule, when the chain needs to be tightened in the event of failure or threatened failure, the danger is that the chain will be found to be weak in two important links. I look forward to the discussions to be held with my noble friend the Minister and pay tribute to his and his department’s willingness to hold those discussions on a cross-party basis. I hope that we will see some way as to how this conundrum may be resolved, to retain a strong legal chain of responsibility without encouraging or permitting micromanagement of the bodies in the NHS, to which powers are rightly to be devolved. If we find a solution, that in itself will do a great deal to assist in the confidence that my noble friend Lady Cumberlege rightly points out is lacking among the public and the NHS in the political process. I add only this. In my view, these two clauses could simply be deleted without doing any violence to the purposes of the Bill. That is because the principles of decentralisation and autonomy and the avoidance of micromanagement are defined and limited by the Secretary of State’s powers woven into the very structure of the Bill and into the way in which the bodies relate to each other under the provisions of the Bill. I suggest that these clauses merely serve to muddy the waters.