European Union Bill

My Lords, sunset clauses are appropriate in some legislation: for example, when one has emergency legislation and Governments take exceptional powers. Those powers may have an effect on civil liberties for instance. Counterterrorism Bills sometimes have such an effect. However, this is not emergency legislation; it is legislation that seeks a long-term and permanent change in our relationship with Europe. There is another reason why a sunset clause would be inappropriate. It is in effect, as proposed, a reversal of primary legislation via a resolution. It is a fast-track procedure for removing legislation. In a way, it is a bit like the Article 48(6) provision in the European Union treaty which this Bill is designed to act as a safeguard against. One is either for or against this legislation, and many noble Lords have given reasons, powerfully and eloquently, why they are deeply opposed to it. However, they cannot have it both ways. To suspend the legislation, either in whole or in part, is to fudge the decision. If noble Lords do not agree with the legislation, they cannot hide behind amendments that would allow the referendum requirement to be taken out while maintaining the appearance and the structure of the legislation giving effect to consultation and decision by the people. As the noble Lord who speaks for UKIP said, this will arouse suspicions among some members of the public that Parliament is taking away the right to be consulted while giving the appearance that that right still remains. I can think of nothing that would be more likely to undermine trust than to maintain the legislation on the statute book but incorporate into it a provision that would take the guts out of it. Two versions of the sunset clause have been put forward: Amendments 15 and 15B. Amendment 15, of course, goes very wide, because in effect it allows the disapplication of the whole of Part 1 and of Schedule 1. I do not agree with the clause for the general reasons I have given, but in addition to the general reasons, Amendment 15 has some unintended consequences. It removes not just the referendum lock but the Act of Parliament lock as well, in some instances. Passerelles and parliamentary control under Clauses 7 and 10 are to be removed. Many noble Lords who have been against the Bill have said, ““Oh, but we approve of the parliamentary control; we approve of the need to have an Act of Parliament if there is a transfer of power””, but under this wider version of the sunset clause, that, in many instances, will go. Not only the referendum lock will go, but the parliamentary lock as well. That might be why the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goodhart, has put forward a narrower version of it that concentrates on Clause 6 and Schedule 1. Of course, that is even more pick and choose, because it says that any provision—not the whole of Clause 6 or the whole of Schedule 1, but any provision within Clause 6 or Schedule 1—could be suspended. Again, I put it to the House that this will give the appearance that the referendum lock remains, but it will in effect be removed when the Government decide that it would be convenient to remove it. It also, in some instances, does away with the parliamentary lock where that falls under Clause 6. For example, there would be no requirement for parliamentary approval if there was a decision to join the European public prosecutor, or no parliamentary lock as regards the passerelles under Clause 6. The noble Lord pointed out that this was just for the duration of the Parliament; it would have to be renewed in future Parliaments and would be suspended only temporarily, but if you suspend a particular provision temporarily and give away the power under the temporary suspension of that provision, you have given it away permanently. There is not much use in having the power back after you have given away the power that you originally wanted to protect. This is very dangerous. It is far-reaching and would give rise to a very cynical reaction among the public if carried.