European Union Bill

My Lords, I beg to move Motion B1 in the name of my noble friend Lord Triesman. The original amendment which this House carried reduced the number of referendum locks in the Bill from 56 to three—that is not counting major treaty change. That was the amendment that we carried and that has been considered by the other place. This amendment substitutes for the position we took on that occasion the view that referendums should be mandatory only where, in the view of the Secretary of State, they are of major economic and constitutional significance. I assure noble Lords opposite that that is fully in line with the policy of the Labour Party. When the Bill first went through the House we were told many times by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that all the issues covered were constitutionally or economically significant, but when you actually look at it, that cannot be the case. When you look at the questions of moving from consensus, or unanimity, to majority voting listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill, they cannot conceivably be regarded as constitutionally significant. For instance, there are matters such as the approximation of national laws affecting the internal market, the guidelines of economic policies and excessive deficit procedures. As we know, on one of these items—the British Government changing the list of military products exempt from internal market provisions—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, pointed out that we had been arguing for this as a country in our national interest for years in the councils of the Union. So the Bill contains far more referendum locks than those that could be regarded as of major constitutional significance. Noble Lords on the government Benches are fond of quoting the Lords Constitution Committee when it suits them. What they fail to quote is the major conclusion of the Lords Constitution Committee on referendums—that they should be used only on matters of major constitutional significance. They cannot conceivably argue that all the items covered here pass that test. If we do not apply this test, as in this revised amendment, we are making a major move from a representative democracy to a plebiscitary democracy and that is something that should be of as much concern to Eurosceptics as it is to pro-Europeans. The other problem with this plethora of locks, as we have argued before, is that they will gravely inhibit the ability of any British Minister or Government to represent our national interests in European on a flexible basis as issues come up. No Government will volunteer to hold referendums, not because they fear Euroscepticism but because, as has been shown by all the academic evidence that has studied them, referendums are, in the main, decided by the people on issues other than the question being asked. That is what you get in a plebiscitary democracy. All kinds of issues are decided on questions that are nothing to do with the subject of the referendum. If it is impossible to put issues to referendums, then Britain will be very constrained in its European policy. If this is continued for 10 or 20 years, it is bound to lead to a process of British self-marginalisation in the European Union. I do not believe for a second that that is what the noble Lords, Lord Howell and Lord Wallace, and the Benches opposite want. However, the truth is that the Adullamite cave of anti-Europeans in the other place and in the Conservative Party, who have insisted on putting the Bill in the coalition agreement, want to make Britain marginal in Europe because they want the Bill to lead to Britain coming out of the European Union.