European Union Bill

My Lords, I am deeply grateful for the consideration which the House has given to my amendment and for the warm and supportive words of the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Triesman, and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who seized on an argument that I was about to deploy myself in response to the noble Lord, Lord Howell. I will address the points of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, in a moment and bring my remarks to a conclusion by addressing the Government’s response. I am grateful too for the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson. Frankly, I did not understand her argument that somehow possession of veto was going to help us in any circumstance in advancing the cause of reform of Article 346. I shall correct her on a practical point: she says that since I was involved with defence there have been a lot of changes in the world, including the end of the Cold War. I think she is going back to the time when I was a defence spokesman in the Conservative Party. My experience of defence in government ended 13 months ago, in May last year. I always enjoy the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, to these debates. He deployed an argument today which I have heard him deploy in other contexts. It is, ““If it is such a good idea, why not have a referendum and you will win it? The public will support you””. I am not sitting close enough to see whether he has a twinkle in his eye when he says it but I think he has. He knows as well as I do that there is no prospect of having a referendum on a subject as esoteric as Article 346. If we have a serious opportunity to change it, it is no use saying to our partners, ““For once we have got the chemistry right—there is an opportunity to go for QMV on this, and then maybe there will be a consensus and we’ll get some reform. But sorry, chaps, you’ve got to wait for two, three, four, five or six years, when it is particularly convenient for us to have a referendum with a whole package of measures””. Even then, as I have said before in these debates, it would be quite unsatisfactory for the British electorate to do their homework on a whole series of rather technical matters. It is just not practical politics. The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, knows more about politics than I do; he has been involved in politics longer than I have, and I am quite certain that he had his tongue in his cheek when he said those things. I move to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, on behalf of the Government. He started off by saying that Article 346 had been in the treaties in one form or another—of course, it had different numbers—since 1957. What is new is the idea of having a referendum on a change. That is brand new. It has not come in yet—it is in the Bill before us. That is what I want to change. It is not an argument against changing this new measure that the instrument that we might want to use to reform Article 346 is now under threat from a new provision in this Bill, so it would be sensible for us to remove that threat. I do not think that there is a logical argument there against my proposal. Like the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I really wondered how serious the noble Lord, Lord Howell, was when he said that it may be in our interests to prevent protectionism to have a veto, because then we could stop our partners from being even worse protectionists than they were before. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, in that case the noble Lord, Lord Howell, would have logically opposed the whole single market programme. It would not have made any sense at all. So the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, and Lord Cockfield were actually doing something very dangerous in threatening greater protectionism by agreeing to have qualified majority voting in the Single European Act. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, tried to justify that approach with the distinctly implausible suggestion that different rules applied to defence. I do not think that different rules applied to defence; I think that the argument is rather different from that. That is why, for two reasons, I think there might be an opportunity to achieve QMV, if only the British Government have not deprived us of that opportunity in advance, ab initio. First, there is a positive incentive on Governments to reduce the costs of their defence procurement—and protectionism, as we know, is extremely expensive. If they opened their markets they would be able to purchase more cheaply, given a measure of defence capability. When I was the Defence Procurement Minister—and I was very proud of this, because I did it for the first time—I introduced a unilateral open market in the EU. I said, ““Sorry, we’re going to buy the cheapest and the best, wherever it is. We’re not going to be protectionist””. It is only when there is inequality of quality and price between the British supplier and non-British supplier that I will favour the British supplier. I made that absolutely public, and it was what I operated on. For example, I bought the 42-millimetre cannon for the Scout vehicle and potentially for the Warrior upgrade from France. Why? Because it was the best. The French were obviously delighted. There was no quid pro quo. I said to my French colleague, Laurent Collet-Billon, ““You know, you and I must do something””. He said, ““Of course, mon cher collègue, we will see what we can do””. But of course nothing has come through. Unless we do something about this protectionism, it will probably not.