European Union Bill

I respect what my noble friend is saying, but one has only to pause for a moment and think about the phrase, the European Union's financial interests. Who will interpret that? How widely or narrowly will that be interpreted? Will offences be generated by the misuse of structural funds or other arrangements to do with the EU's finances? We do not know. We do not know who will define these things, but we can see clearly that they may well lead to a prosecution authority outside the UK, when we have our own prosecution authorities which are perfectly adequate in most—indeed, in all—cases to deal with those matters. We will have a prosecution authority from outside the United Kingdom for the first time charging and prosecuting British citizens. That is one reason why a huge uncertainty hangs over that. Furthermore, once set up, although it is confined to EU financial interests now, the range can spread. Who is to say that it may not? We do not know. All those matters are reasons why many European countries—possibly the majority—are reluctant to see a development of that kind and why, if a Government in this country decided to change their mind, flatly against what the previous Labour Government wanted and flatly against what the present Government want, that should certainly be one item that should be put to a referendum. I turn now to some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, which were very reasonably put. I know that he felt that he was in a consensual and concessionary mood and looked for some reciprocity from the Government. In that, I fear that he will be disappointed. The passerelles allowing for a move to QMV, which are listed in Clause 6(5), have been included simply because they are covered by Schedule 1. That is obvious to most of your Lordships. It would be wildly illogical to provide for a referendum on an amending treaty which abolished those vetoes without also providing for a referendum on any decision to use the passerelles attached to the specific articles listed in Clause 6(5), which would achieve exactly the same result. That would be tantamount to locking the front and back doors of the house—not closing them, locking them; and not throwing away the key either, but giving the key to the British people—but leaving the kitchen window open. I have made clear before our firm belief that the Bill will not lead to the litany of referendums that some noble Lords keep suggesting—although I think there has been a learning curve on that. History tells us that individual vetoes do not get abolished on an individual, ad hoc basis, just as treaty changes tend not to be piecemeal and ad hoc without good reason: namely, that they are important and urgent. I take the example of the Czech and Irish protocols agreed during the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. They are a very good example. They have been held back until the next accession treaty. Why? Because of the arduousness and length of going through a round of treaty change just to agree to append those protocols. Just because Schedule 1 and Clause 6 are detailed does not mean that there will have at some point to be a separate referendum on each of the provisions listed. Although that point is to me self-evident, I am not sure that it is accepted or understood by all noble Lords who have spoken. All the items in Schedule 1 are wired into the major issues, the six red lines to which the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, rightly referred. I have in front of me and could share it with the House, although that would be very tiring and boring, the way in which every one of the articles in Schedule 1 relates to one of the six red lines which successive Governments have stood by and which are of great interest to ordinary citizens. One is left asking: what are the extra powers or extra veto surrenders which the Opposition and others of your Lordships seem to want and are too nervous to put to the people? We have given up past vetoes on the annual budget, with disastrous results. We gave up a veto on Article 122, which made us liable for the European financial stability mechanism, with disastrous results. What are these new vetoes that are required to be given up to make the European Union work? We have never had a clear answer to that question.