European Union Bill

My Lords, I will look first at Amendments 57 and 58 and then come to the vagueness charges embodied in Amendment 59. I will seek to explain why the words are in the Bill. Whether the explanation is acceptable to the Committee is another matter at the moment. I will explain that the words that are in the Bill work the other way: they add to the precision of the legislation rather than to the vagueness of it. I will come to that in a moment. As noble Lords have recognised, Amendment 57 would include on the face of the Bill that Clause 18 does not alter the rights and obligations that the UK signed up to on becoming a member state of the European Union. It also seeks to legislate explicitly that Clause 18 does not alter the primacy of EU law. I am grateful to your Lordships for drawing attention to these two important principles: that the EU law has primacy and that the UK must honour its obligations as an EU member state. I assure the Committee and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Lea, with his Amendment 58, that the Bill supports both those principles. Indeed, the Bill has to support them. It is not a question of choice. The Bill has to support those principles because to do otherwise would put us in breach of our obligations as EU members. I have serious concerns about Amendment 57. It does not reflect accurately the legal position regarding the UK's membership of the European Union. I say that because the UK follows the dualist constitutional model. Giving treaties effect in the UK is always a two-stage process. That did not seem to feature in the debate that we just had. The first stage—the signing of the treaty during which the UK may take on rights and obligations—is governed by public international law. The rights and obligations assumed by the UK on becoming an EU member state are governed by public, international law rather than domestic law. Those rights and obligations are binding on the United Kingdom under international law irrespective of the existence of the European Communities Act or any other Act of Parliament and will continue to be so as long as the UK continues to be a member state of the European Union. It follows that the EU Bill does not and cannot change the rights and obligations assumed by the United Kingdom on becoming a member of the European Union. It would be misleading to suggest in this or in any Bill that any Act of Parliament could do this. Such a change could only be done by the UK renegotiating the terms of its membership of the European Union. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, that Governments can of course seek to bind future Governments. Most Governments whom I know, and whom many of your Lordships know, have sought to bring in great legislation. Let us take, for instance, some of the privatisation provisions under the earlier Thatcher Government. Our hope was that those would endure. We hoped that a future Government would feel bound by privatisation visions, not renationalise the whole of the then privatised sector—indeed, our hopes were in fact borne out. However, a Parliament cannot bind a future Parliament; that is a completely different proposition. It is of course possible that a future Parliament could repeal the 1972 Act although, interestingly, that would not remove the United Kingdom from the European Union. It could only be done by negotiation through Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union but those things are possible. Parliament can do anything and is supreme. Noble Lords have asked what the point of Clause 18 is and why it is in the Bill. It confirms that the second stage of the dualist system, whereby the rights and obligations taken on by the UK are given effect in UK law and can therefore be enforced through the UK courts, must always be done by an Act of Parliament. Any suggestion that EU law constitutes a new, higher autonomous legal order and has or can develop into part of the UK’s legal system independent of statute are thereby refuted. That is very important indeed. Noble Lords may say: ““So what? That is what the courts have always upheld””. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, acutely observed, it has been challenged. I think that the prosecution in the metric martyrs case tried to float the idea in the counter case that EU law had some autonomous existence independent of our own statute law. It has been raised and to say that it is not in question is simply factually wrong when people have questioned it. It is therefore the view of the coalition that it is right and valuable that this declaratory clause should be in the Bill. Even if it can be said that the courts have so far upheld that position, as my noble and learned friend Lord Howe is well aware—having been, as he said, the father, godfather and grandfather of the 1972 Act and much of the legislation that flows from it—and as I know and we all know, these matters are challenged. They are, from time to time, challenged by learned legal minds and there is dispute about them. Far from this clause being unnecessary, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, ventured to argue with great clarity, I maintain that on the basis of our own experience—what we hear, read and see in the public debate—it is necessary that it should be in place. That is my view on Clause 57 but I will obviously think hard about the views that were put forward by extremely acute and expert minds on this matter. However, I said that I would set out how the Government see the matter and that is how we see it. Amendment 59 was a very important part of the argument put forward by a number of noble Lords, including my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Let me explain why we have in there ““an Act of Parliament”” rather than ““by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972””. I reassure my noble and learned friend that we have thought about this very carefully because it is a complex balance of issues and we wanted very much to get it right. The Government accept that Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act is commonly identified as the primary way in which EU law takes effect in the UK, but unfortunately that is not quite right. There are other Acts which can be interpreted as giving effect to EU law within the UK; for example, there are some provisions of the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 2006, the Northern Ireland Act 1998—and I believe there were other earlier Northern Ireland Acts as well, as I remember taking part in some myself. Then there are the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Equality Act 2006. They all put Ministers under an obligation to act in accordance with EU law without reference to the European Communities Act—and there may be other such Acts in future. Who knows? We have to prepare for these things. It was to address this concern and those facts that Clause 18 was deliberately drafted to refer to Acts in the plural, or an Act of Parliament, rather than solely referring to Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. I reassure my noble friends that having carefully thought about it and come down on that side of the argument, which we believe to be the comprehensive and effective one, there was no sinister purpose. It was simply a design to ensure that all the means by which directly effective or applicable EU law could be given an effect in the UK legal order are addressed. That is the raison d’etre and the underlying argument why the clause is there, why it is necessary and why it is so worded. I would like to say a final word, or semi-final word—or penultimate word—about the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, at Second Reading, which he touched on again today. He queried what on earth paragraph 113 was doing in the Explanatory Notes, which refers to the, "““UK subordinate legislation … and … Acts and Measures of the devolved legislatures””." The answer is that EU law can be given effect in the UK legal order, not only directly through primary legislation but through means of delegated legislation adopted under primary legislation. The obvious example of this is the secondary legislation giving effect to EU measures adopted under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act, and the reference in Clause 18 to, "““by virtue of an Act of Parliament””," covers that aspect. I said that was my penultimate comment. My noble and extremely learned friend Lord Howe did that dangerous thing of mentioning the Commonwealth, which has not really come into this Bill at all. I cannot resist making the point that if we are to promote the interests of this nation as a positive member of the European Union, and to do so fit in to this extraordinary new world in which all the wealth and accumulated savings and first the economic and now the political power have shifted to a degree away from the Atlantic nations and the west to the new emerging worlds of Asia, Africa and Latin America, these are the new networks in which we must also involve ourselves. We must work to ensure that our European membership enables us to take our full part in these things to reinforce each other. I had to get that in, only because my noble and learned friend tempted me. It has very little to do with the amendment, but I think that I have explained why the two points raised by noble Lords with great learning and authority fit in to the fact that the clause is necessary; it may be declaratory but it does a job, and that is why it is there, and it is drafted as an Act of Parliament rather than the European Communities Act 1972 but deliberately and carefully. I think I said a word about the amendment intended to help proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lea. I assure him that there is no way in which Clause 18 alters the commitment or position of the primacy of European Union law, which in turn rests as it always must on the will and Act of Parliament supported by the courts. That is why I would ask noble Lords and the noble and learned Lords to consider what they have put forward and withdraw the amendment.