European Union Bill

My Lords, what has come through in the debate is that it is hard to see a strong purpose for Clause 18. It is not the best drafted clause I have ever read in legislation, and I understand why—or at least I think I understand why, which I will come to in a moment. But it is also true to say that the Explanatory Notes to the Bill do the clause no favours. They do not set out why it is compelling or why any of us who think that it is obscurely drafted should feel that we can put our hand on our heart and say that we know exactly why it is written as it is. I certainly do not feel that way. I am not a lawyer. I am not learned in the law, which is the expression that has gone around the Chamber. I am a humble mathematician and I am trying hard to understand the considerable obscurities of law when compared with mathematics. It is important to ask, as did the noble Lord, Lord Deben, only a short while ago, what the clause as it is written is for—I shall come on to the alternatives in a moment. Everybody agrees that it is declaratory in its reference to the 1972 Act. It looks as though it is attempting to balance a number of arguments which plainly have gone on in the background between those who are uncomfortable with the idea that Europe has any bearing on the way we conduct our legal lives, and may continue to do so, and those who recognise that that is a fixed reality because of the processes that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, described in a very helpful speech. It is hard to understand the necessity of Clause 18 and it is reasonable to say that, as drafted, it is open to very wide interpretation. As a couple of noble Lords have said, that would probably make it open to judicial review. I find myself in strong agreement—I hope that it will do her no harm—with the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, who said that the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee’s report gave not the most glowing reference which anybody has written to a piece of legislation. The report is written with the niceness that parliamentarians occasionally reserve for a description of something they think is very poor, but, none the less, it says, in terms pretty much, that it is very poor. The Government in their response almost give up the ghost after a very short period of trying to defend it, because there is no certainty, I think, even on their part, that this was the right way to do it. I cannot see the point of the clause or that it is at all helpful. I have real sympathy with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, that parliaments cannot bind their successors. That view at least, about the character of parliamentary Government, must be common ground among us. In those circumstances, it must be common ground that Parliament is supreme, and it must be common ground that, should Parliament wish to stand down the 1972 Act, it would be within its competence to do so. It is extremely unlikely that it would, but that is neither here nor there in the terms in which the noble Lord put that proposition to the Committee. The supremacy argument is very powerful. One of the reasons that I have great difficulty with much of this legislation is that it seems to reduce the role of Parliament and the supremacy that it should enjoy. The points that have been made ad nauseam in your Lordships' House about multiple referenda do nothing for the objective of propping up the supremacy of Parliament, but the general proposition made by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, must be right. If the Government feel that it is essential to have in place a clause that is declaratory, it might as well have the following characteristics. First, it should be so clear that even those of us who are not learned in the law understand it. Secondly, it should be sufficiently clear that it does not give rise to frequent legal challenge. Thirdly, it should make reference to—if I may put it this way—the core code that is involved in European legislation and not gloss over that. For those reasons, Amendment 57 offers greater clarification. It may well have been written with people who are used to dealing with sovereignty issues somewhere in the background, but it is none the less a straightforward clarification. Beyond that, Amendment 59 does that by a very direct reference to what I described as the core code—to the central proposition about why the status of our relationship to Europe is as it is. If we did not have this clause at all, which would be my preference, much of what I said in the past few moments would not be particularly relevant. But if there is to be a declaratory cause it should at least have the characteristics that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, introduced in his speech this evening. It is impossible to misinterpret or misunderstand it. That has great merit and I hope that he will not mind my saying so from the opposition Benches. It does not alter my view that, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, said, the clause is not really necessary, but Amendment 59 has a convincing pedigree and that is what recommends it to me.