European Union Bill

The reasons lie in the procedures that flow from the Lisbon treaty, which gave birth, rather unwillingly, to the ordinary revision procedure. The whole idea of it getting into that treaty was a compromise, as noble Lords who followed it all closely will remember, but that is where it comes from. Whether powers are transferred or treaties are changed by the ordinary revision procedure or by the special revision procedure is of no particular interest to those concerned with our powers and competences moving away from this country to the European Union in ways that are not fully explained or subject to the appropriate procedures and rules that this Bill lays down. I hear exactly what the noble Lord says, but he asked me a specific question and I have given him the specific answer that whether these changes are under the simplified revision procedure or the ordinary revision procedure they should ideally be treated in the same way. That is what is happening in other countries. I have a note here that states that Ireland and Denmark examine all uses of Article 48(6), the simplified revision procedure, in the same way as the use of the ordinary revision procedure to decide whether a referendum is required. It is done by the Attorney General in Ireland and by the Ministry of Justice in Denmark. I am told that it is now going on in Denmark in relation to the simplified revision procedure applied to the matter, already discussed in this House, of changing the treaty to accommodate the European stability mechanism. I will come back to that in more detail, but that is the answer to the noble Lord’s question. In addition to the significance condition already provided for in Clause 3, the amendment would insert a provision that would allow for the possibility of a Minister seeking to rely on urgency as a reason to avoid holding a referendum. In a previous debate in Committee, we debated what the Government mean by a transfer of power, and I will recapitulate some of the points in detail when I come to my comments on the other amendments in this group. These two amendments would mean that if a Minister deems a particular decision to be urgent and in the national interest, he could dispense with the referendum requirement regardless of the nature of the transfer of power from the UK to the EU or the significance of that transfer of power. If there was ever a proposal under Article 48(6) to give up the member states’ veto over the areas where we will still retain the right to oppose measures taken at EU level, such as decisions on the seven-year financial perspectives or on social security, if these amendments are agreed, a Minister could claim that giving up these vetoes was considered urgent and in the national interest and therefore should not be put to the British people for them to have a say but should rather by approved solely by Parliament. This shows a lack of understanding of how the system works and how the simplified revision procedure works. Let me give noble Lords an example. The use of the simplified revision procedure to enable member states in the euro area to set up the European stability mechanism to safeguard the financial and economic stability of the euro area is obviously a matter of vast import. It will take 21 months—one year and nine months, which is admittedly not two years—to be finalised. It was agreed in March 2011, and the target date for final approval is the end of 2012. That is hardly what most people would consider urgent. Even under the simplified revision procedure, which may or may not be associated with the passerelle—I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that they are in a sense separate, although criss-crossing, issues—the whole process of changing treaties, whether by the simplified procedure or the ordinary revision procedure, takes a long time. The urgent issue of saving the eurozone from its tribulations will take one year and nine months. This example of an urgent and important treaty change certainly sets a precedent that shows that there would be more than enough time for the UK to hold a referendum, should one be necessary, under any future uses of the simplified revision procedure that I described. I remind noble Lords that one will not be necessary for the current use of the simplified revision procedure as the present change to do with the European stability mechanism does not apply to the UK. The truth of the matter is that while urgent issues arise, the business of putting them through the simplified procedure or the ordinary procedure is extremely lengthy. This is one reason, which I shall come to in a moment, why these things will only rarely occur. The picture of a series of small referenda issues coming along is a completely unrealistic. In fact, it is a fantasy. Whether they go through one way or the other, it will be a lengthy and complicated process, and nations will rightly seek to exert the leadership that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, referred to of using existing competences rather than having to resort to the kind of treaty change that leads to major debates of the kind we saw over Lisbon. The truth of the matter is that this amendment would have no practical impact as there would not, in practice, be a situation where an Article 48(6) decision could be rushed through in a matter of weeks or months—it is more likely to be months and years—and the amendment would, in fact, be pointless. That has dealt with those two amendments concerned with urgency, and I now want to turn to the broader issue.