Postal Services Bill

My Lords, the purpose of Amendment 14 is to provide for the disposal of shares to take place in tranches or batches rather than all at once. In keeping with our previous amendment, the batches are at 30 per cent and 19 per cent, to maintain Royal Mail in overall public ownership. Of course, the Government may wish to propose different figures, but the same principle would apply. One of our difficulties with the Bill is in trying to grasp the detail and discover exactly what information is in it—whether there will be an initial public offering or a trade sale at auction. The Government have not set a clear timetable and they have not explained whether there will be a general sale of shares to the public—an IPO—a restricted sale to certain categories of buyer or a trade sale by auction to a single buyer, such as a private equity firm or a postal competitor, which may raise competition issues. They have not been clear about how valuable public assets will be allocated between Post Office Ltd, the pension funds and Royal Mail, thus finding their way into private hands. They have not indicated how the board might be constituted. They have not ruled out dismantling Royal Mail and selling off the most profitable parts, in particular GLS, its successful European parcels service, and Parcelforce. They have not indicated how they will guard against a buyer with short-term horizons seeking to squeeze costs and cherry pick the assets. Before any sale takes place, this House will want to be assured about the future of the universal service, the exact regulatory regime and the future of the post office network. The Government have not explained any measures to ensure value for money for the taxpayer and—this is the subject that this amendment focuses on—they have not explained whether they would sell the whole company all at once, with the risks that that involves of selling cheaply, or whether they would be prepared to sell in tranches. There is a huge amount of evidence that, when privatisations have taken place in the past, the value for which the businesses were sold was too low, as my noble friend Lord Lea has demonstrated. This is most clearly evidenced where a general sale of shares has taken place. When the shares are traded, it is easy to see what price they trade at and how this compares with the original sale price. If there is a big gap and the original sale price is much lower, it indicates that the shares should have been sold at a higher price—the taxpayer has lost out and someone has pocketed a pretty penny as a result. With Associated British Ports, which was 35 times oversubscribed, the share price rose 23 per cent in one day. With Amersham International, sold for £71 million, the share price rose 32 per cent on the first day of trading. As early as 16 May 1984, the Public Accounts Committee in its 17th report expressed concern at stock in public corporations being sold, in the words of the committee, at an, "““immediate substantial premium creating windfall gains for the investor at public expense””." It recommended considering selling in tranches, as was normal practice in the sale of large quantities of government bonds. Selling by tranches worked in a number of cases. For example, in the case of National Power, the share price rose 22 per cent a day after the first tranche sale but only 4 per cent after the second tranche was sold. Powergen’s first tranche of shares appreciated by 22 per cent within one day, but the second batch rose only 3 per cent the day after. Of course, it is difficult to predict what the reaction of investors will be to the disposal of shares. It is undesirable for the shares to be offered, either in an IPO or a trade sale, in one single tranche, which would have the effect of transferring 100 per cent ownership in one go, albeit with 10 per cent or so employee shares, if that is to be the figure. There is a strong case that transfers should therefore be staged. Our amendment proposes this, such that shares representing no more than 30 per cent of the value of the business should be capable of being transferred in the first year following the Act coming into force and no more than a further 19 per cent in the following year. The Secretary of State has complete discretion over the disposal of all Royal Mail shares. There are a number of issues to consider. The market may be glutted by a complete offering and so reduce the value. Privatisation of Royal Mail separate from the post office network is an innovation, so it will be best to proceed by degrees to ensure that the universal service is not jeopardised. If the value of the shares rises, the taxpayer would be a loser if the initial share sale were a complete sale. There is a real prospect that Royal Mail may be undervalued or overvalued by the Government. Ministers have yet to put a value on the Royal Mail Group at this time—or, if they have, they are being exceedingly coy about it. Estimates of the value of Royal Mail have varied wildly. Many factors will impact on the value of the business. The prospective regulatory regime, the industrial relations climate, the onerous nature of the obligations placed on Royal Mail—all these factors and others will determine the value of the business and its share price on flotation. There are, then, strong arguments for the sale to be implemented in tranches. That would allow for a wide variety of approaches to possible amendments. For example, tranches could be subject to various reporting procedures to Parliament to guarantee effective oversight. I stress that in our amendment we have been consistent with our wish that overall ownership of Royal Mail should remain in the public sector. However, the principle of selling by tranches to avoid underpricing would apply to any percentage of sale, including 90 per cent or 100 per cent. I hope that the Minister sees merit in the notion that disposals should be by way of tranches and that she will either accept the amendment or give assurances to the Committee about how the Government intend to proceed.