Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [Lords]

Given the flexibility that we need, I believe that we have struck the right balance by allowing an interim arrangement on the basis of reasonable suspicion followed by a longer-term arrangement on the basis of reasonable belief. Sometimes, it is a question of timing and we may need to act first on freezing assets and subsequently to make an arrest—we must remember that after all, the vast majority of those in the UK who have been subject to a freezing order have gone on to be arrested. For example, if we limited the Treasury's freezing powers to those charged or convicted, we could prevent the UK from co-operating with international partners when we are trying to prevent funding getting to international terrorists and terrorist groups. For those reasons, the Government remain convinced that the legal test as set out in the Bill—reasonable suspicion for an interim period of 30 days and reasonable belief for a final designation—strikes the right balance. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge mentioned the role of the courts, which has also been raised by civil liberties groups. They have called for a mandatory court involvement in asset-freezing. They want freezing decisions either to be made by the courts or to be approved by them mandatorily, but the Government do not support those proposals. Decisions to freeze assets are national security measures taken on operational advice from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and fall squarely within the remit of decisions that Ministers should and do make on other matters, such as prescription, deportation and exclusion. Ministers are accountable for their designations both to Parliament and to the courts. We also do not believe that mandatory court approval for asset freezes is the right approach. Only a very small minority of asset-freezing cases—around 10% of current cases—concern people in the UK who have not been prosecuted for a terrorist offence. The remaining 90% of cases concern either individuals in the UK who have been prosecuted or individuals and groups overseas. Mandatory court approval would therefore add no value in that 90% of cases. Indeed, it might even be unhelpful. For example, overseas terrorist groups who do not currently challenge asset freezes would nevertheless have their designations subjected to mandatory court scrutiny. My hon. Friend also mentioned written reasons. We heard today that the JCHR recommends that an express requirement to provide reasons for a designation, subject to public interest requirements of non-disclosure, be written into the Bill. The Committee's reasons for that were eloquently put, but the Government are not convinced that an express obligation on the Treasury to provide reasons for a person's designation is necessary. It is already a requirement of the basic principles of administrative law to provide reasons for a designation where possible, subject to public interest requirements. If this Government or any other were to write into a Bill all the Treasury's obligations under administrative law, such a Bill would be considerably longer. I do not see that as desirable. The time available for parliamentary scrutiny should not be spent debating unnecessary provisions. I should also make it clear that there will be times when the Government cannot divulge the case against a person or the reason for a designation, such as when sensitive intelligence has been relied on for a decision and there is an obvious case for withholding information. None the less, where possible, the Government disclose information when that can be done without, for example, damage to a pending prosecution or to national security. There is no sensible reason to go beyond that and write such a requirement into the Bill. The JCHR also sought to convince hon. Members that the Government should accept the principle set out in the House of Lords in the case of AF on the use of special advocates and closed-source material. It said that that principle should apply to asset-freezing provisions. I am sure that hon. Members have read Hansard and are aware of the debate on that in the other place. I can but restate the points that the Government made then. First, the courts have not considered whether AF applies in asset-freezing cases, and it is not the role of the Government to prejudge what the courts would say. Secondly, the Supreme Court will consider the wider application of AF (No. 3) in January 2011 when it hears the Tariq case. Thirdly, the Government are committed to ensuring that any challenge to a Treasury decision is heard fairly. Finally, the application of AF (No. 3) is part of a wider debate on the use of special advocates and intelligence material, and we have already announced that we will be considering the use of special advocates and closed-source evidence as part of a Green Paper next year. There will be plenty of opportunity for the JCHR and other interested parties to relay their views as part of the consultation that informs that Green Paper. It is right and proper that the Government give all parties the option of commenting on such an important mechanism without prejudging the outcome. The final matter raised by the JCHR is the question of transparency and accountability. The Bill strengthens transparency and accountability in two ways. First, we are enshrining in legislation the Treasury's existing practice of presenting quarterly reports to Parliament on the operation of the powers in the Bill. That will guarantee transparency on the quarterly operation of the regime. Hon. Members will note that the most recent quarterly report was laid today. Secondly, we have written into the Bill that the operation of the regime should be independently reviewed nine months after the Bill is passed and every 12 months thereafter. The JCHR maintains that the provision in the Bill for an independent reviewer does not go far enough and that the independent reviewer should be more independent of the Government—the right hon. Member for Delyn made that point in the debate. I am sure that that will be debated further in Committee, but the Government cannot accept the JCHR position. We are committed to effective scrutiny of the asset-freezing regime and the independence of the reviewer will be a principal objective of any appointment, but for Parliament to approve the independent reviewer would be a significant departure from standard practice. The appointment of the reviewer by the Government reflects the long-standing principle that Ministers are directly accountable to Parliament and the public for those whom they appoint and for the operation of the regime.