Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [Lords]

I remind the House of my former profession as a barrister, and I compliment the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) on his outstanding contribution to the debate. I could agree, in broad terms, with much of what he said. In the case of re M, Mr Justice Ognall stated:"““We live in an age when funds may be transferred from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as rapidly as it takes me to speak this sentence.””" Those sentiments encapsulate the difficulties and predicament that we face today. How do we fulfil the UK's duty to be at the heart of the international fight against terrorism, while protecting the basic human rights and freedoms that Britain has always prided itself on advocating in both theory and practice? We know that the legislation derives from United Nations Security Council resolution 1373, a European directive and the decision in Ahmed v. HM Treasury. Experience shows that most individuals who are engaged in or intent upon serious offending can often live with the authorities taking away their guns or explosives, or with their liberty being taken away, but what hurts them is taking away their money, because that is what fuels so much of the offending and allows the criminal or terrorist to operate. The Bill goes a long way towards fulfilling that duty: it enables the Treasury to freeze the assets of those suspected of involvement in terrorism, with such decisions being made at national level on the basis of advice from specific law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. Of course that means that much will rely on the accuracy of the advice received, but I suspect that the vast majority of the British public will not find such a proposal fundamentally objectionable. It should be borne in mind that many of these decisions have to be taken rapidly in circumstances where the stakes are high and the potential consequences for both sides are catastrophic. UN resolution 1373 specifically states that we should ““freeze without delay””. I suggest that the specific content of the resolution is such that there is a real desire to move at great speed. However, that must be seen in the context of our commensurate duty to be at the heart of the international effort against terrorism. Secondly, it must meet the expectations of the British public, by making the work of the terrorist organisation that much harder. Although other anti-terrorism measures may be already on the statute book, they do not fulfil the obligation set out in resolution 1373. There will be—and this is accepted—an improvement. There are rights of appeal and judicial review that give safeguards to those caught by an order. It should give some confidence to the wider public that a specific individual has his rights properly preserved. It should also be noted that legislation such as this should never be judged by specific statistics. The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) quoted specific statistics in his speech, but this type of legislation acts as a preventive measure that dissuades individuals involved in terrorism from using the UK banking system. Prevention is clearly better than cure. The new Bill provides the power to freeze assets on a preventive basis on a reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity. Where that threat is involved, it is difficult to envisage how any other test could effectively be applied. The test is also subject to the safeguard that even if the Treasury considers there to be reasonable grounds for suspecting a person to have been involved in terrorist activity, that person's assets can be frozen only when it is considered necessary for public protection. I want to deal with three final points in relation to the legislation. I will not go into the detail that others have in the past. First, how will designated persons fund their appeal? At present, they are in a position whereby their ability to fund their appeal is effectively non-existent. Such legislation has cropped up in other matters of asset freezing down the years. Secondly, and most worryingly, the definition has gone from ““reasonable suspicion”” to ““reasonable belief””. That is, at best, a marginal change. Many a good lawyer would argue that there is almost no difference there. What is quite clear is that that is less than 50%. Something that is less than 50% always concerns any lawyer—it does not matter whether we are talking about a human rights lawyer or someone who is against the whole idea of terrorists in every particular way. When we talk about less than 50%, we have to ask what we are dealing with. Are we dealing with something that is 49%, 40%, 30%, 20% or 10%? That discrepancy is a concern, and I hope that it is addressed when it comes to the individual protestations of change that will be put before the House at a later stage in consideration of this Bill. Finally, there must be a more wholehearted review of all these matters. We keep enacting piecemeal legislation after individual Acts have been passed over a period of time. It is not a good situation to have specific Acts dealt with on a specific short-term basis. My concerns are assuaged by what the Supreme Court said in the Ahmed case. It quashed the terrorism order on the grounds that the inclusion of ““reasonable suspicion”” as a threshold was not necessary or expedient. It noted that ““reasonable suspicion”” was not specifically referred to in UN Security Council resolution 1373, and it concluded that the general words of section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946 did not give anyone the authority to make an order that interfered with fundamental rights on the basis of a ““reasonable suspicion”” threshold. However, and I suggest that this is the key point in relation to why the Government are going ahead on this basis, the Supreme Court did not condemn the terrorism order on wider grounds of incompatibility with human rights. Those members of the court who commented on the arguments in the Ahmed case suggested that the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 was disproportionate and dismissed such arguments. I hope that we will go forward with a greater sense of will so that when the Macdonald report and other such reports come before the House, we are in a position to consider everything together.