Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [Lords]

I do not disagree with that. We are a member of the UN, and we need to co-operate, and I do not disagree with the need for a framework. All that is understandable, but what I am saying is that we want a fair framework, and one that will stand the test of time and not be struck down because of some perceived illegality. That is all I am saying. I am probably ad idem with the hon. Gentleman on the whole issue. I appreciate that this is a global problem. That is why it is, quite rightly, being tackled by the UN, but my point is that we need to be careful about how we introduce any measures. Lord Phillips, president of the Supreme Court, has said that the basic rights to which I am referring are a ““vital part”” of the fight against terrorism. He said:"““The so called 'war against terrorism' is not so much a military as an ideological battle. Respect for human rights is a key weapon in that ideological battle. Since the Second World War we in Britain have welcomed to the United Kingdom millions of immigrants from all corners of the globe…The Human Rights Act is not merely their safeguard. It is a vital part of the foundation of our fight against terrorism.””" As I have said in respect of resolution 1373, we are going further than required, and by imposing the freezing of assets we could be in breach of article 1 of the first protocol to the European convention on human rights. We must also consider the right to respect for family and private life under article 8, and the right of access to a court under article 6. People who will be subject to these freezing orders will not necessarily know the case against them, which is a clear breach of article 6. The deputy president of the Supreme Court, Lord Hope, described the effect of designation by the Treasury in the following terms:"““It is no exaggeration to say…that designated persons are effectively prisoners of the state…their freedom of movement is severely restricted without access to funds or other economic resources, and the effect on both them and their families can be devastating.””" So there it is. The hon. Member for Cambridge described the powers as ““draconian””, and they are certainly strong and punitive by nature. In the Ahmed case, the Supreme Court held that the United Nations Act 1946 did not give the Treasury the power to make such a broad order and the asset-freezing regime was immediately voided. Rather unusually, the Supreme Court refused to grant a stay of execution of its judgment. In the Ahmed case, Lord Brown noted:"““The draconian nature of the regime imposed under these asset-freezing orders can hardly be over-stated. Construe and apply them how one will—and to my mind they should have been construed and applied altogether more benevolently than they appear to have been—they are scarcely less restrictive of the day to day life of those designated (and in some cases their families) than are control orders. In certain respects, indeed, they could be thought even more paralysing.””" I have made the point that there should be better safeguards. I appreciate that the appeals procedure and the change from reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief are steps forward, but the argument that the imposition of these coercive orders is best undertaken by Ministers rather than the courts seems to misunderstand the separation of powers and the role that the courts already undertake. In particular, it ignores several decades of practical experience in the courts, which have been making ex parte asset-freezing orders in a wide range of civil and criminal proceedings for the past 35 years or more and so are quite used to the procedures. As regards national security, it seems highly implausible that the judges who sit in the specially constituted division of the High Court that hears financial restriction cases under part 6 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 are somehow less capable than their colleagues in the commercial division of hearing an emergency application for a freezing order. Freezing orders are just one of many orders that the courts are much better placed than the Executive to make. I agree with a point that the hon. Member for Cambridge made in an intervention that if the measure were operated in conjunction with an arrest warrant, people might be a bit less concerned about what the Bill might mean in due course. I hope that amendments might be proposed requiring that designation-making powers should be in the hands of the courts and not simply the Executive and requiring the designation regime be brought into the criminal justice system when designations are made against an individual, rather than a group. Applying those coercive powers on the basis of suspicion of or belief in people's involvement in terrorism will inevitably lead to people who have never been prosecuted having orders imposed on them. The right hon. Member for Leicester East has pointed out that those who have had orders lifted are still in a precarious and highly embarrassing position because they have at some stage been suspected of terrorism, which is hardly going to place them in good standing with anybody. I should like there to be a requirement on the courts, when making a designation, to grant a licence to enable an individual and their family to have access to such funds as are reasonably necessary for their subsistence and travel and fees for legal representation if that need arises. That would ensure that a licence was made when the matter kicked off. I should also like the Bill to reflect and uphold the basic principles of a fair trial by ensuring that any person who is subject to the regime knows in full the case against him or her and is able to present a full defence. That would involve removing the powers for special rules of court that allow for secret evidence, hearings that the interested person is barred from and the use of special advocates. The report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights has been mentioned. The Committee would like to table useful amendments on the standard of proof. Its report states:"““We recommend that the Bill be amended to require a summary of reasons to be given in the written notice of designation, subject only to legitimate public interest concerns about non-disclosure. A mandatory statement of reasons in the written notice of designation would help to ensure that the new right of appeal is an effective remedy.””" The report also deals with the right to a fair hearing, recommending that"““the relevant provision of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 be amended so as to require rules of court to secure that the court's otherwise absolute duty of non-disclosure in asset-freeze proceedings…is expressly qualified by the duty to ensure sufficient disclosure to protect the right to a fair hearing.””" There are one or two other useful suggestions, but this is Second Reading so I shall not go into great detail. I should like to finish with two quotations. First,"““we will not defeat terrorism by reneging on this law””—" the law being the Human rights Act 1998. The quote continues:"““Upholding human rights may sometimes be terribly inconvenient in the fight against terrorists, but it is the price of democracy. We must have confidence that our democratic values can prevail. The terrorists want us to distort and bend our democratic values as we take them on—if we do that we play into their hands.””" Those were the words of Mr McNulty, an old sparring partner of mine, who was the Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing from 2006 to 2008. He has come to the view that we have to reconsider the balance in deciding how to proceed. Finally, I sincerely hope that the Bill will be drastically improved in Committee, because I do not want to see another example of what is becoming a regular occurrence—the Supreme Court having to do our duty for us. We are the legislators, so let us get it right. If we do not, we must heed the words of Edmund Burke:"““Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.””"