Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [Lords]

Indeed, but I still consider it to be a relatively small amount. It is certainly a smaller amount than I would have expected if I had not seen any of the data. Let me return to the question of what constitutes a terrorist offence. We know of specific instances of arrests using anti-terrorism powers that have been deeply inappropriate. I am sure that Members will recall the case of Walter Wolfgang, who was ejected from a Labour party conference and arrested—under anti-terror legislation—when he tried to return. I do not think that we should pass Bills allowing us to deal in such a way with people like that—or indeed Iceland, which was also subject to anti-terror rules, or the BBC photographer Jeff Overs, who was stopped while taking photographs of St Paul's Cathedral in November 2009 and arrested under the same rules. Surely that is not what the Bill ought to be about. I should welcome a stricter definition of terror offences from the Minister. As ever, we are seeing an expansion of the present definition. Another recent example, which is highly topical at present, is that of a gentleman called Paul Chambers, who was recently convicted of sending a menacing tweet that threatened a terrorist activity. It read:"““Crap! Robin Hood airport is closed. You've got a week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I'm blowing the airport sky high!””" I should add at this point, for reasons of which some Members may be aware, that I am Spartacus. The tweet led to a conviction under section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 for"““Improper use of public electronic communications network””." Surely that is not appropriate. The tweet did not actually threaten terrorist activity. It led to legal fees of £3,000 and the loss of the gentleman's job, which is utterly ridiculous. We need to be careful about allowing these powers to expand and take in more cases. I need hardly remind Members that Jean Charles de Menezes was also ““reasonably believed”” to have been involved in terrorist activity. We must also be clear about the reasons for which someone's assets are being frozen. I fear that the Bill currently allows far too little information to be given to individuals to enable them to defend themselves. I would propose an amendment suggesting that as much information as possible must be given to the relevant person. We must bear in mind the possible public interest in non-disclosure, but, except when it simply is not possible, the balance should be in favour of openness, so that people can genuinely defend themselves. Similarly, we should require a fair trial and a fair hearing. I would propose an amendment making it clear that the accused must have enough information to be able to instruct the defence. That is an essential part of a fair trial. The report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights contains a detailed case analysis, drawing a comparison with control orders. Many of us are concerned about the impact of excessive powers when victims have had no opportunity to defend themselves properly, and advocates in closed courts do not enable them to know what is going on. The Government rely on a very thin distinction to avoid some of the legal hearings that have resulted from control orders. They argue that judges have commented that control orders do not apply to terrorist asset-freezing. I do not buy such arguments. I urge the Government to adjust the Bill now so that it works, rather than doing what the last Government did so often: waiting until an expensive court case arose, then being forced yet again to amend legislation in an ongoing cycle. The role of Parliament is important. I am pleased that reports are to be made, but I believe that they should be made to Parliament rather than to Government. We have a responsibility to the people to verify that the powers are being used. The independent reviewer should be confirmed by Parliament, and should report to Parliament. It should not be up to the Treasury to vet reports before passing them to us; that should be our responsibility. As I said to the Minister earlier, I am concerned about the licences that are dealt with in clause 17. It should be made absolutely clear that the Government will ensure that there are sufficient funds for reasonable living. As far as I can see, no such requirement currently exists. According to Lord Wallace of Tankerness, there is a ““general presumption”” that more is needed. I am also concerned about the level of information that is required by clause 20. It may be very onerous to provide that level of information if the Treasury chooses to make it so. In the case of Ahmed, the Supreme Court noted the extraordinary burden that the requirement could place on a designated person. For example, the wife of one of the designated persons was"““required to report to the Treasury on every item of expenditure, however small, including expenditure by her children””." Is that really what we want, and what we expect from the Bill? Designated persons will have limited funds anyway. Do we actually want the Treasury to go through itemised lists of toiletries, sweets, school books and bus tickets? The Bill should make clear provision for no account to be taken of very small amounts. Clause 22 raises the issue of self-incrimination. Article 6 of the European convention on human rights includes a privilege against it, but the Bill does not. According to the Government in the other place,"““the right against self-incrimination would form a reasonable excuse””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 6 October 2010; Vol. 721, c. 197.]" It would form a reasonable excuse, that is, to refuse to comply with a request for such information in clause 22. I think that that should be made clear in the Bill. The onus should not be on the accused to make the case after being prosecuted for providing the information. Another fascinating part of the Bill which I hope can be changed is clause 25(1), which states:"““Nothing done under this Chapter is to be treated as a breach of any restriction imposed by statute or otherwise.””" There are a couple of exceptions, but I find that very concerning. It appears that the Bill is exempt from all rules that might apply to it except the two that are listed in the clause. That might catch, for example, the Human Rights Act. I see nothing in the Bill suggesting that the Act applies to it. Indeed—although I am sure that it would be tested in court—it could be argued that the clause expressly states that the Bill is exempt from the Act's provisions. I hope that that is not what the Government intend. Similarly, what about common law torts? What about negligence? What about defamation? Nothing in the Bill secures any of those aspects of common law. I hope that the Government will replace section 25(1) with a provision that actually states what they probably intended. At present, it is dangerously unclear. Asset-freezing is a very strong power, but a very necessary one. Because it is so strong and because it can be so draconian, it must be fair and properly controlled, and it must be applied only to those who are actually involved with terrorist activities.