Yes, it would, but my point is that new clause 7 does not perfectly encapsulate the purpose that the hon. Gentleman, the Government and I might share of making government fit for purpose in that new Parliament. Given that we do not have to pass this new clause as part of the Bill, it seems sensible to take our time, listen to representations and people's views, and see whether we can come up with something better.
We have heard very clearly that the issue at stake is the size of the Government's payroll vote. The proposition we have heard is that the Bill will give the Executive undue numerical dominance in the House and that we must therefore legislate now to reduce the number of Ministers here. It is a numerical fact that if the Bill becomes law, and unless we legislate to the contrary at some stage, the Government elected in 2015 will be entitled to make Ministers out of a higher proportion of the Members of the House. They will not be compelled to do so, but they will be entitled to, and recent Governments have tended to appoint as many Ministers as they can, or very close to that number. My right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister and I have acknowledged before that this issue deserves consideration, and it would not take a great detective to find the number of occasions on which I have said precisely that. On the face of it, it is not desirable that the payroll vote should be expanded as a proportion of the House's membership. We have said that we will consider how to address this issue and we will do so.
We are told that Governments legislate too much, and the new clause concerns an issue that might be better resolved without legislation. Governments are capable of reducing the number of Ministers without being compelled to do so through legislation. More importantly, perhaps, the payroll vote is often taken to include Parliamentary Private Secretaries, who are not covered by current legislation and who would not be covered by the new clause. It is only by self-denying ordinance that those numbers are limited. Governments have clearly been capable of self-restraint, and that self-restraint would still be necessary if the new clause were accepted. As I have said, under the previous Government we had not only Ministers and PPSs, but tsars, envoys, special representatives, Regional Ministers and assistants to Regional Ministers. A lot of them have been removed but they were all elements of patronage within the House. If it is patronage we are seeking to address, then we have to address all those appointments, not just the ministerial ranks.
Let me repeat a point that was made earlier. Legislation would not cover the number of Opposition Front Benchers, which is also relevant if the concern is that there are too few independent voices from the Back Benches. I accept the principle of legislation on ministerial numbers as a back-stop, but surely the number of Ministers must be a function of need, which is not necessarily related to the number of MPs. When previous statutes increased the number of Ministers in the House, they were unrelated to any changes in the number of MPs: there has never been a clear link or a set ratio. At the moment, there can be one Minister for every 6.842 Members of Parliament or thereabouts. The new clause would enshrine that ratio in law in perpetuity. If it were to become law, the Government could appoint as Ministers no more than 87.692307 Members of the Chamber. That would be the relationship. I merely make the point that I do not believe that a simple arithmetic relationship is necessarily the right one to address.
We should not forget the purpose of having a ministerial presence in the House: we need sufficient Ministers to attend to the business in the House, to make statements, to answer questions, to introduce Bills and to contribute to debates. The House rightly expects the highest standards of accountability from its Ministers and we strive to meet those standards. Indeed, it is often complained that Ministers are too rarely seen when the House discusses issues for which they do not have direct responsibility. That reflects the reality that we demand a lot of our Ministers in this country, both to govern and to legislate.
The question of how many Ministers should sit in the House of Commons is bound up with other questions—for example, considering the number of Ministers in the House of Lords. As the Committee is aware, my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister is chairing a Committee on reform of the House of Lords. The Committee comprises Members from all three major political parties, as well as from both Houses—[Interruption.] From a sedentary position, the hon. Member for Rhondda asks, ““What's that got to do with it?”” as though reform of the House of Lords—the thing for which we have been arguing for 100 years—has nothing to do with the constitutional arrangements of this country.
The cross-party Committee is discussing all issues pertinent to reform, including size and composition, and whether the second Chamber is wholly or mainly elected. It will also discuss the position of Ministers in the reformed Second Chamber. Currently, there are far fewer Ministers in the House of Lords than in the Commons, but we will need to think carefully about how the distribution of Ministers may be affected by any changes to the size of the second Chamber, or by the introduction of elected Members.
The Committee is charged with producing a draft Bill early next year, which will then be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. The Government hope that will be carried out by a Joint Committee of both Houses. It is possible that arguments may then be made for either a greater or smaller ministerial presence in the second Chamber. We should wait to hear the views of the Committee.
There is also an argument that the limit on Ministers in the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 is arcane in other respects. For example, it makes no provision for Ministers who might fill the role on a part-time basis or a job share. It is expressed in terms of numbers of individuals rather than full-time equivalents. That should perhaps be part of any consideration.
For all those reasons, although I welcome the debate, the Government are not minded to accept the new clause. We shall reflect on the arguments made today and set out plans once we have achieved some consensus on the composition of the second Chamber, including the number of Ministers there. If it still appears—[Interruption.] I think it is important for the House to hear this. If it still appears necessary, there will be plenty of time at that stage to legislate before 2015. I urge the hon. Member for Broxbourne to withdraw the new clause, on the basis that we shall very carefully consider the arguments he has made.
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
Proceeding contribution from
David Heath
(Liberal Democrat)
in the House of Commons on Monday, 25 October 2010.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee of the Whole House (HC) on Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill.
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