Local Government Bill [HL]

My Lords, I should have declared my interest as a resident of Norwich at the beginning of my contribution to the previous debate. I do so now. Government Amendment 2, to strike out Clause 1(3), raises important constitutional issues—they were raised by the judgment in the High Court—and I want to offer some remarks about them. The noble Baroness’s amendment provides that it should not be Parliament that revokes the structural change orders because, she says, it is unnecessary, given that the judge in the High Court has already quashed them. However, perhaps we could just think about the implications of this constitutional situation. Is it not in fact rather remarkable? Is my understanding of the British constitution so old-fashioned as to be obsolete? I thought that Parliament was the sovereign law-making body in Britain. Thirty years ago, I do not think that that would have been disputed. When Parliament took the decision that we should join the European Community, Parliament knowingly and deliberately subordinated Westminster legislation to the authority of the European Court of Justice, but Parliament retained and retains the power to undo our membership of the European Union. When we incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into our domestic law, Parliament specified that judges should be entitled to point out any inconsistencies between legislation passed by Parliament and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, but specifically did not give the judges power to set aside Acts of Parliament that they deemed to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Meanwhile, however, over the past 40 years of judicial activism, the scope of judicial review has grown enormously. Many of us have welcomed that. Many of us, time and again, have been grateful to the judges for acting to strike down acts of an overweening and incompetent Executive. We accept the power of the judiciary to quash administrative acts by the Executive when they are in breach of the law or when procedures have not been properly followed. That is one thing. Although his arguments are debatable, I can understand why Mr Justice Ouseley found grounds to criticise the Department for Communities and Local Government and the previous Secretary of State. However, it is surely an entirely different matter when a judge takes upon himself to quash orders that have been formally approved by Parliament. The structural change orders were extensively debated in both Houses, with both Houses, thanks to the report of the Merits Committee and numerous speeches made by noble Lords, including by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, being fully aware of the facts and the issues that exercised Mr Justice Ouseley. Being aware of those issues, both Houses voted to approve the orders. I am told that there are precedents for the quashing of secondary legislation. Indeed, the Minister cited one to us in one of her letters. I am also told that the precedents have all been at the level of the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, now the Supreme Court. I stand ready to be corrected if my information is wrong, but I understand that, for the first time, a High Court judge has arrogated to himself the power to overthrow legislative decisions properly made by Parliament.