As the Minister well knows, there are far wider arguments than those regarding control orders about the use of intercept as evidence. We should at least consider explicitly revisiting the terms of the Chilcot review, particularly regarding the requirement for intercept as evidence to be operationally workable, because such conditions might be too onerous to achieve the desired outcome—an outcome that is in line with our core values as a parliamentary democracy operating under the rule of law. I hope that a review of those operational requirements is now taking place implicitly. Without access to the intelligence and to information about the methods, it is difficult to draw a considered conclusion on intercept, but I want to take this opportunity to signal that we remain of the view that the potential benefits are so substantial that serious work must continue to be undertaken about its possible use.
Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism
Proceeding contribution from
Crispin Blunt
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Monday, 1 March 2010.
It occurred during Debates on delegated legislation on Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism.
About this proceeding contribution
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506 c734 Session
2009-10Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamberSubjects
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