Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

If the hon. Gentleman can restrain himself, I shall now explain the circumstances in which we propose to deal with the orders. We are now very close to having the opportunity to achieve a considered process, so the balance of argument has changed. It now runs strongly against our seeking to unpick the piecemeal and scattergun laws, introduced in an unfocused and unreflective manner, that govern counter-terrorism policy. For that reason, I shall ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to abstain this evening. As a party that aspires to have responsibilities in this matter and that might be quite close to getting them, we believe in taking a responsible approach. Our direction of travel is clear, a point reinforced by the quotation from my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer). If the electorate charge the Conservative party with forming a new Administration, we will want to send a clear signal that we do not propose to defend our nation's values by abandoning them. As an important signal of that we will certainly seek a replacement for this construct of control orders, but we do not intend for that replacement to be introduced in a rush or in a piecemeal fashion. It is our plan to use the first parliamentary Session of any new Administration to prepare the work for consolidation and reform, including that of control orders. When that work is complete, we will hope to introduce a consolidation and reform measure in the 2011-12 Session but, like every other piece of legislation, it will have to win its place in the parliamentary timetable against all the other competing priorities. However, I see no harm in explaining our objectives now so that the House can understand the context in which we will seek to rid ourselves of these powers. Having taken into account the double uncertainty of the Conservatives' winning a majority and the new Prime Minister's asking me to continue with these responsibilities—I console myself that some academic study has revealed that 60 per cent. of shadow Ministers make such a transition in practice—we should not wholly discount the possibility that I might be back here in a year's time, in the Minister's place, with all the intelligence now at his disposal, making a case for a final renewal of these powers before they are overtaken by a wider review of all counter-terrorist powers. If that is the case, I wonder how many of those who will support these orders tonight will have reversed their views if they are then occupying the Opposition Benches. Having made clear my party's position on how we want to reconsider the current measures, I want briefly to set out why, in the absence of a review of all powers, we cannot support the renewal of control orders tonight and to consider some the alternative options that should form the basis of a review of the regime. As was the case last year, I anticipate that the consensus reached by the House will be that, to quote the then Home Office Minister, the hon. Member for Gedling (Mr. Coaker),""nobody is in favour of having control orders if we could possibly do without them".—[Official Report, 3 March 2009; Vol. 488, c. 735.]" That view has strengthened since the Minister made that observation a year ago. In March of last year, three men under control orders—AF, AN and AE—challenged the legality of the orders to which they were subject on the ground that their right to a fair hearing was compromised""by reason of the reliance by the judge making the order upon material received in closed hearing the nature of which was not disclosed to the appellant."" That, as the Minister has told us, was declared unlawful under article 6 of the European convention on human rights—a view that was upheld by the Law Lords in June of last year. In the light of that judgment, the Government reviewed the 15 control order cases and in one case the order was revoked rather than further information being allowed to be disclosed. According to the noble Lord West, those no longer subject to an order will be placed under surveillance in the same manner as the 2,000 or so people currently considered a risk by the Security Service. That prompts a question about the merits of a regime that places expensive and cumbersome restrictions on 11 individuals while carrying out alternative forms of surveillance on 2,000. Most worryingly, the Government have built the regime in order to place restrictions on a tiny number of individuals who they say pose a significant threat. Yet, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) made clear in his intervention, seven of those very dangerous people have absconded—and some have vanished. How can it be that, the last time the director of the Security Service gave a public number, it was assessed that there were some 2,000 individuals in the UK who were considered a threat and on whom, to quote Lord West,""we are keeping varying close eyes"," yet, of the handful of individuals deemed so dangerous that they are subjected to administrative detention in the form of a control order, seven have absconded? In his evidence to the Select Committee on Home Affairs, Sir Ken Macdonald went even further, calling control orders "a mistake" and stating that""the reality of the control order regime as it exists…is that it does not work"," before concluding that they have""brought our system of government into disrepute"." So, the Ministers who oversee control orders recognise that they are flawed and would rather be rid of them. Legal experts, including of course the judges who have so undermined the legality of control orders, think that they should go. This year, the Home Affairs Committee joined the growing number who state categorically that control orders are ineffective and legally dubious. I share the conclusions of the Committee when it says that""it is fundamentally wrong to deprive individuals of their liberty without revealing why."" There is no pledge to take steps to replace control orders and no undertaking to find an alternative that can keep us safe. Instead, the Minister for Policing, Crime and Counter-Terrorism is guilty of "institutional inertia" and, to quote again from the Select Committee's report, he is prepared to settle for""sub-optimal solutions, rather than proactively reforming to meet ever-changing threats."" It is clear, too, that the costs of control orders are spiralling. The Minister declined to answer a written question I put to him on the cost of the control order review group because it would be too expensive to answer—I wonder whether he would care to share with us now a rough and ready estimate of that cost? It is clear that aside from the costs to individual police forces who have responsibility for controlees, the legal costs alone are prodigious and are likely to continue to rise. More than £1.5 million were paid out in 2006-7, rising to over £1.8 million in 2008-09. Since 2006, the total cost in legal fees alone to the taxpayer has been some £8.6 million. It is perhaps surprising how many lawyers are opposed to control orders. Throw in the costs accrued by the Legal Services Commission and that figure reaches more than £10.5 million. Added to those figures are the growing costs claimed against the Government by the controlees. Lord West insists that control orders remain a means of managing the threat "at a sensible cost", yet no Minister is prepared to come clean on the overall costs of what is clearly an astronomically expensive way of detaining people without charging them. So, it is clear that the status quo is unworkable and must be improved. How are we to achieve this? Again, the consensus seems clear. We have to find a means to bring admissible evidence against individuals to court. The independent reviewer Lord Carlile, in his most recent report, writes of one controlee that he is""a dangerous terrorist who would re-engage with terrorism the moment he could"" whereas another is""assessed as having been trained abroad in terrorist activity, and to have been involved in considerable terrorist planning and facilitation in the UK."" To repeat the point made by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), who is no longer in his place, one has to wonder whether those cases have been reviewed in light of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which made such training abroad an offence. The picture painted for us is that even with all the caveats there appears to be a fairly significant intelligence footprint and it is hardly surprising that there are growing demands that if the intelligence is that reliable, there should be a means of presenting some of it in admissible form. On the issue of intercept as evidence, it looks again as though "institutional inertia" is preventing any real progress. Time and again Ministers, lawyers and the independent reviewer reiterate their position that they do not oppose intercept in principle, but progress remains painfully slow. The Director of Public Prosecutions is the latest such expert. He has stated:""Evidence obtained by interception would be of benefit to prosecution"" in respect of terrorism. The independent reviewer has repeatedly said that he is not opposed in principle to the admissibility of intercept. In December last year, the Home Secretary reported on the fact that initial findings showed that the use of intercept would not be "legally viable". I share his view that that is "disappointing", and I hope that when he reports to the House ahead of the Easter recess on the three new work streams that are to be considered as part of the Chilcot review, he will have better news to report.