Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

That might be a way forward, but my preference is to say that there should be an affirmative procedure unless the requirement to do otherwise is proven. That should be the default option. If I understand clause 24 correctly, it is even more extraordinary than it first appears. It seems to suggest that if by some miracle the House of Commons votes against a treaty in a resolution, the Government then get another go. They can say that they disagree with the House, then wait another 21 days and ratify anyway. If the House votes against the treaty again within that 21-day period, the Government get another 21 days. They can keep disagreeing with the Commons until the Commons gives up. That seems quite appalling. The Government should not be allowed to defy the Commons at all, not even once. When it has voted not to ratify a treaty, that should be it. If we go further into the clause, we get to the powers of the House of Lords, which is in an even worse position than the Commons. If it votes against a treaty, it can be overridden by mere ministerial fiat. A Minister can simply sign a declaration stating that he disagrees with the House of Lords. The clause seems to be a mere show—a shadow play, a simulacrum of change. If we look through the whole clause, we see that no real power is being transferred to the House at all. What should we do about that farce? Our amendments are intended to put the situation right in three different ways. As I have mentioned, amendment 1 would replace the negative procedure with the affirmative so that treaties would not be ratified unless both Houses of Parliament had positively approved them. There would be no get-out clause whereby the Government could simply override a House of Parliament. That is the second point of the amendments—the Government would not have a second go in the Commons.