Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

I shall speak to clause 31. I have two points to make about it, and I am looking at the Minister and hoping that he will be able to concentrate on the points that I make. I mean no discourtesy in saying that, because I know that he was taking advice earlier, as I often had to do when I was in his position. The expulsion and suspension resolutions are set out in clause 31(2)(a) and (3)(a) respectively. There are two elements involved in them: first, that the peer in question must have acted in a disreputable manner, and secondly and differently, that the disreputable conduct of that person must have brought the House of Lords into disrepute. Both elements have to be satisfied before a resolution can be made. One need only examine that proposition to see that it may be expressed somewhat unsatisfactorily. I can well contemplate circumstances in which a Member of the other House has behaved in a disreputable way, but that conduct is very much personal to him or herself and cannot sensibly be said to bring the House into disrepute. They are separate things. They may be linked, and disreputable conduct may bring the House into disrepute, but it does not necessarily do so. Under the current phraseology, unless both elements are satisfied, the suspension or expulsion resolution cannot be made. I wonder whether that is right, and I therefore suggest that the Minister look again at the phraseology that defines the criteria giving rise to the resolution. I suggest that he question whether the two things should be disjoined so that disreputable conduct that does not bring the House into disrepute would be grounds for a suspension or expulsion. There can be a legitimate debate about that, but that the issue arises seems clear, and it should be addressed. Secondly and rather differently, I should like to say something about the circumstances in which the resolution can be made. The Minister will know that I tabled an amendment—amendment 45—which for good reason was not selected for debate. Under that proposal, one third of those qualified to vote would be required to vote in favour of a resolution before it could become effective; in other words, there would be a weighted vote. As I understand it, the amendment was not selected because that is a matter for the Standing Orders of the other place, and it would be improper for the Committee so to regulate, which I am happy to accept. However, the point that troubles me is this: we must consider concepts of natural justice, and there is a possibility that a party with a majority in the other place, or in this place for that matter, could act in an arbitrary manner. After all, a suspension or expulsion resolution would bear very heavily on the reputation of the individual concerned—moreover, it might affect that person's livelihood in a fairly dramatic fashion—and it is therefore right that that power should have some constraints. It is worth reminding ourselves that, for example, criminal cases, generally speaking, require a unanimous verdict; even when they do not, they require the verdict of 10 jurors. The resolution that we are contemplating would be made simply on a bare majority, but is that in itself right? I am far from certain that it is, which gives rise to the question whether the other place should, if it comes to consider the way in which it operates, consider questions of natural justice and set out in Standing Orders either the degree of notice that should be given to the House, so that the Government or whoever cannot act arbitrarily, or that there should be a weighted vote, so that a very substantial number of those entitled to vote do so. Otherwise, we are exposing people to the risk of arbitrary action that bears very heavily upon them.