Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that intervention. He makes an important point, but I think that I have already dealt with it. In our view, some offences axiomatically bring the House into disrepute and therefore merit automatic disqualification—that is why those offences are so categorised—while other offences are subject to the opinion of the House. It is not for us to prescribe that, and that is why we have allowed this discretionary power. It is fundamental to the principles of parliamentary privilege that the other place should make its own decisions on such issues. He is right that there will be some instances of behaviour that bring the Member personally into disrepute but do not, in any common-sense way, affect the reputation of the House at all; there will be other kinds that do both. However, that is a matter for the other place to judge, and that is why we are allowing for this discretionary power precisely to deal with the sort of issue that he has raised. I will reflect on it further, and I am sure that there will be further discussion of it in the other place, if nowhere else. In the House of Commons, matters concerning conduct and discipline are dealt with in Standing Orders and in the Commons code of conduct. The provisions in the clause would allow the House of Lords to establish a similar regime, dealing with some aspects in the Standing Orders and others in the code of conduct along the lines of the existing code. Subsection (3) extends the existing power of suspension currently available to the House by removing the existing restriction that a period of suspension may not be longer than the remainder of the current Parliament. Instead, the duration of the suspension may be for any period specified in the resolution; again, that is in keeping with the principles of proportionality that we are trying to put forward. The mechanism for the expulsion of a Member is set out in subsection (2). The House passes an expulsion resolution that states that the Member loses his or her right to receive a writ of summons. The resolution is given effect by the removal power at clause 30. A power is also provided at subsection (2) that any writ of summons already issued prior to an expulsion resolution shall have no further effect. It is important to stress that that does not mean that the power to expel and suspend is retrospective, but that it cannot be trumped by a writ that has already been issued. Subsection (4) of clause 31 provides the mechanism for suspending the Member. The House issues a resolution that states that in the House's opinion the House is in disrepute because of the conduct of that person. I hope that reassures the right hon. and learned Gentleman. The resolution must also state that that conduct warrants suspension of his or her entitlement to a writ of summons, and that accordingly the Member's entitlement should be suspended. That will mean that the Member loses his or her right to sit and vote in the House of Lords, and accordingly is not a Member of the House of Lords for the period of the suspension. Subsections (5) and (6) together provide that the powers of suspension and expulsion should be exercisable only in relation to conduct that occurs after the date of the making of the Standing Order, which must occur after the date when the clause comes into force. That will mean that the suspension and expulsion provisions are exercisable only prospectively and therefore do not apply to conduct that brings the House of Lords into disrepute if it occurs before the clause comes into force. We are aware that there may be some expectation that the peers whose conduct last January led to the calls for tougher provisions should be subject to the powers in clause 31. However, it is important that we maintain the principle of retrospectivity. The conduct of those peers has already been dealt with by the other place following the conclusion of investigations into the allegations against them. Two of the peers were suspended for the remainder of the parliamentary Session. We believe that it is fair and just that Members whose conduct has been or could have been dealt with under rules previously available to the House of Lords should not be punished a second time. Without clause 31, the House of Lords is unable to expel one of its Members, regardless of any crime or misconduct that they may have committed. I am sure that you will agree, Sir Michael, that that is an invidious and untenable situation, and that the clause is necessary. I therefore ask that it stand part of the Bill.