Coroners and Justice Bill

Motion C That this House do not insist on its Amendments 59, 119, 121, 236 and 239 to which the Commons have disagreed. My Lords, we return once again to the offences of inciting hatred on grounds of sexual orientation and, in particular, to the question of whether these offences need to be accompanied by a so-called ““freedom of expression”” saving. The key point for your Lordships’ House is whether, in the light of the clear and unambiguous views of the elected Chamber on many occasions, it is right for this House to insist on these amendments. Members of the other place have said emphatically that a freedom of expression saving is not required. They have now done this not once, not twice, not thrice, but four times. At the Report stage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, on 9 January 2008, the other place voted by a majority of 169 to reject the freedom of expression saving. On 6 May 2008, during consideration of this House’s amendments to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, the other place rejected the saving by a majority of 202. During the Report stage proceedings on this Bill, the other place voted a third time, by a majority of 154, in favour of the repeal of the saving. And on Monday last, the other place rejected Lords Amendment 59 by a majority of no less than 197. Set against the majorities the Government can normally command in the Commons, these are substantial defeats for the freedom of expression saving. Of course, as a revising Chamber, it is perfectly legitimate for this House to ask the other place to think again. What is, I would argue, of questionable legitimacy is to ask the elected House to think again, and again, and again, and again. There must come a point where this House, with all its great virtues and its importance, gives way to the House that has been elected by the people of this country. The Government would argue that this is the time when, with reluctance, that is what this House should do, the House of Commons having voted so substantially for opposing the freedom of expression saving. This House has made its position clear. We recognise the strongly held views of those who argue that Section 29JA of the Public Order Act should remain on the statute book. I reiterate our view that this provision is simply not needed, given the exceptionally high threshold for the offence, capturing as it does only threatening words and behaviour intended to stir up or incite hatred. Our submission is not simply that the saving is not necessary but that it is positively harmful as it could sow doubts about the scope of the offence and seek to legitimise the use of threatening words or behaviour which are intended to incite hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. Those who use such words or behaviour and intend to incite hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation should not have a so-called freedom of expression saving to shield them. A very high threshold for the offence provides sufficient protection for freedom of speech. If that were not the case, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Equality and Human Rights Commission would no doubt have been the first to point that out. Both bodies gave careful consideration to the offence and each concluded that freedom of speech is sufficiently protected without any need for Section 29JA. Noble Lords will also recall that the offence may only be prosecuted with the consent of my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General. As public authorities, both the Crown Prosecution Service and the Attorney-General are bound by the Human Rights Act and must therefore act compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights on freedom of expression. I know that other noble Lords will wish to speak in this debate, so I shall be short. Our submission is that the time has now come for this House to recognise and respect the will, expressed four times by large majorities, of the democratically elected Chamber, and not seek to insist on its amendments. I beg to move.