Parliamentary Standards Bill

My Lords, of course, we might have to look at that in the future. We need to be very clear that IPSA will set the rules on paid advocacy under Clause 5 but that the commissioner's functions under Clause 6 are limited to the allowances scheme and breaches of registration of interests. Investigations of alleged breaches of the paid advocacy rules will continue to be a matter for the current standards commissioner who will report to the Committee on Standards and Privileges. I believe we have clarity there. Of course, some issues will have to be looked at later on but there is not a lack of understanding about how the two will interact one with the other. We are in a fairly robust position going forward. I was dealing with the situation in relation to the European Court of Justice. I hope I made it clear that I do not think that the Bill has implications for the relationship between Parliament and the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights. I see nothing in it that raises issues of European Community law that might therefore be justiciable in the ECJ. In so far as issues arise under the European Convention on Human Rights, if, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights argues, the current procedure of both Houses is incompatible with the convention, it would be open to a Member affected to challenge them in Strasbourg. The Government respectfully disagree with the committee that the current position is in breach of MPs’ convention rights. We think that the better view of convention jurisprudence is that Parliament is entitled to have its own internal disciplinary system. In any event, the Bill does not affect the existing procedure, except to add a degree of independence and further safeguards to the investigation process before findings are referred to the committee. I think it might be convenient if I deal with the particular concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, in relation to those two courts. The position is different depending on whether we are talking about the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights. This was explored quite extensively in Committee. The European Court of Justice interprets matters of EU law. Article 234 provides that the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on matters of EU law, and a domestic court may refer such matters to it when it considers that a decision on the question of law is necessary to enable it to give judgment. I think noble Lords were concerned about circumstances that might arise where someone aggrieved as a result of the Bill could have a matter referred from the domestic courts to the European Court of Justice. However, let me make it clear that this is not something about which the Government consider there is any real concern. The subject matter of the Bill relates to the allowances and financial interests of Members of the House of Commons. In the Government’s view, it is very unlikely that anything in the Bill would give rise to subject matter that could be interpreted by the European Court of Justice. I note that this accords with the view that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, expressed in Committee. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, made particular reference to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Incorporation of the charter would not alter the position as I have outlined it because it does not extend the scope of EU law. I now turn to the position concerning the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Government cannot rule out the possibility of matters concerning conduct and discipline in Parliament making their way to the Strasbourg court. I hope I made that clear in my letter. As long ago as 1999, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege noted that, although proceedings in Parliament are explicitly excluded from the Human Rights Act, that does not affect the position of the Strasbourg courts. However, this is a product of the fact that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg court are dealt with by treaty at international law. Unlike the position concerning EU law, matters are not referred by domestic courts to the Strasbourg court. Rather, an individual makes an application directly to that court. Neither the Bill of Rights 1689 nor any amendment to this Bill could alter that position at international law. However, it is essential that the House notes that this can arise at present. It would be possible for a Member of the other place who feels aggrieved by the current conduct and discipline system there to take the matter to the Strasbourg court. In the Government’s view, the provisions in the Bill would only reduce the risk of such occurrences because, for the first time, MPs who have concerns about matters that lie within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations will be investigated by an officeholder who is entirely independent of government and Parliament. A further point to note is that noble Lords should find some comfort from the fact that the Strasbourg court, while not bound by Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689, has shown that doctrine the utmost respect in the past; I refer to the case—the noble Lord has already mentioned it—of A v the United Kingdom, which the Strasbourg court decided in 2003. To give the noble Lord greater comfort, I should say that the majority was six to one. Most people would say that that was a win. The applicant in that case complained that parliamentary privilege infringed her right to access to a court, guaranteed under Article 6 of the convention, by preventing her from being able to sue a Member of the other place in defamation. The Member had made the statements that were alleged to be defamatory in Parliament and was thus, at least as far as the domestic courts were concerned, protected by privilege. Even though not bound by Article IX of the Bill of Rights, the Strasbourg court found that there had been no infringement of the convention. This is because the Strasbourg court held that parliamentary privilege pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring that freedom of speech in Parliament was protected and to maintain the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. The restriction was proportionate because, among other things, it protected only statements made in proceedings in Parliament and the applicant had other means of redress—for example, through the House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges. Although the case was not decided in the context of conduct and discipline functions of Parliament, it demonstrates the great respect that the Strasbourg court has previously shown to the UK doctrine of parliamentary privilege, and is an exemplar of what the margin of appreciation delivers. We expect the Strasbourg court to continue to show such respect in the future. I hope that that explanation will reassure the noble Lord that there is nothing to worry about in that regard.