Parliamentary Standards Bill

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I have to say that I am sorry that that statement has been made before I could explain why Amendment 1, far from clarifying the position, actually creates some confusion and why it is unnecessary. I had better say that, even though the Government have indicated that they will accept the amendment. I was not able to be here yesterday, but let me say at the beginning how sad I am that that most noble and most learned Lord and friend, Lord Kingsland, is not here today to deal with this and how gallantly the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, has stepped in, better than most lawyers. The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, said that he thought that the freedoms of Parliament had been casually thrown into doubt. I do not think that that is true. He has not identified anything in the Bill that puts into doubt either Article IX or the way in which it has been interpreted. The problem with the amendment as it stands is that it applies only to this Act, not to other Acts. Far from clarifying the law, it leaves it in a state of uncertainty, as we will see when we come to judicial review, a tribunal, fairness and other matters. It does not grapple with the central problem identified by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, which is that Parliament is subject to Article 6 of the European convention and when it uses its disciplinary powers in an extreme way there are problems about fairness. The present law is perfectly clear and any suggestion that the courts might need Amendment 1 in order to keep off the grass of Parliament’s lawns is totally wrong. The great case that decided this, in which I appeared on one side, was Pepper v Hart. As we have no constitutional legal adviser and the Law Officers are not here, I remind your Lordships of what was made quite clear in that case. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, said: ""Article 9 is a provision of the highest constitutional importance and should not be narrowly construed. It ensures the ability of democratically elected Members of Parliament to discuss what they will (freedom of debate) and to say what they will (freedom of speech). But even given a generous approach to this construction, I find it impossible to attach the breadth of meaning to the word ‘question’ which the Attorney-General urges"." He continued: ""In my judgment, the plain meaning of Article 9, viewed against the historical background in which it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament were not subjected to any penalty, civil or criminal, for what they said, and were able, contrary to the previous assertions of the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what they, as opposed to the monarch, chose to have discussed. Relaxation of the rule"—" this is the rule against Hansard being used as an aid to statutory interpretation— ""will not involve the courts in criticising what is said in Parliament"." He then said this, which is very important in the context of the Bill: ""Moreover, the Attorney-General’s contentions are inconsistent with the practice which has developed over a number of years in cases of judicial review. In such cases Hansard has frequently been referred to with a view to ascertaining whether a statutory power has been improperly exercised for an alien purpose or in a wholly unreasonable manner"." He cited as an example the case of Brind, where Hansard was used for that purpose in judicial review proceedings. In conclusion he explained why there was no threat to Article IX. The case of Prebble, which I shall not bore the Committee with, was a Privy Council decision where the law was made even clearer. The judges have made quite clear the boundaries of Article IX and the important ways in which they must respect the laws of Parliament and not intrude. I still await to be told by someone what it is about this Bill—especially after the government amendments described by the Leader of the House—that will put any of that in jeopardy. There is the matter of fairness, which we will attend to later, but that is not covered in the amendment. We are rushing to accept the amendment and to get the Bill through. That happened once before, with a previous Government, when we rushed to amend the Defamation Act to enable Neil Hamilton to sue the Guardian, and Lord Simon of Glaisdale and others on the Cross Benches explained why that was a constitutional monstrosity. This amendment is not a constitutional monstrosity, but I urge those who support it to explain what it is about the Bill that requires it.