Parliamentary Standards Bill

My Lords, this Bill is introduced on the basis of a false premise. That premise underpins the desire to fast-track the Bill. Given that it is a false premise, it follows that there is no case for expediting the passage of the Bill and setting aside the House’s recommended minimum intervals between the stages of a Bill. I shall argue not only that there is no case for fast-tracking the Bill but also that there are strong—I would suggest compelling—arguments for not fast-tracking it. The Bill is designed, as we have heard, to help restore public trust in Parliament. Recent months have seen a collapse of confidence in the political class. The problem has not been so much with Parliament as with parliamentarians. There is a widespread perception of a misuse of public funds. The case for expediting the passage of the Bill is that creating an independent parliamentary standards agency to regulate MPs’ pay and allowances, and to do so as soon as possible, will help lance the boil of public anger. This argument fails to grasp the nature of the public anger. As far as the Government are concerned, the crucial point is that the Bill creates an independent body: MPs will not be in control of their own pay and allowances. What this ignores is that the problem is not one solely of public disapproval of how the allowances are being administered; it is the fact of the allowances themselves. They will remain—look at Clause 3. Having an independent body dispersing money to MPs for furniture and mortgages, however independent the body and however rigorous the rules, will not lance the boil of public anger. Believing that this Bill will have such an effect is not only misguided but dangerously so. Had there been greater discussion, not only within Parliament but with people outside, then this may have been apparent. I draw to the attention of the House the words of Natascha Engel, Labour Member for North-East Derbyshire, during Second Reading in the other place when she said: ""Until we know what sort of Parliament the people out there want this to be, it will be much more difficult for us to create an appropriate system of remuneration and reimbursement. We have had any number of opportunities to go out and talk to people, but we have failed at every turn".—[Official Report, Commons, 29/6/09; col. 92.]" We are legislating against a background of public anger but without fully appreciating the depth of that anger and what people want Parliament to do. This brings me to the arguments against expediting the passage of the Bill. Given what I have said, there is no clear case for fast-tracking the Bill. There are, I suggest, three powerful arguments against. An expedited passage will be counterproductive, perverse, and dangerous. First, fast-tracking the Bill is counterproductive. It would, as some noble Lords have already outlined, reinforce the very condition it seeks to counter; that is, a lack of confidence in parliamentarians. The point has been well expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on the Bill. It said: ""We note, with a certain irony, that although the bill is designed to restore public confidence in the House of Commons, it is being rushed into the statute book and will not receive proper scrutiny, as a result. We have been unable to write to the Government to ask for its views on the issues we raise"." It is a point developed in the report on the Bill of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House, on which I serve. Paragraph 23 of the report states: ""There is an undoubted need to restore public confidence in the parliamentary system. It is not, however, clear to us that a cobbled together bill rushed through Parliament will help rebuild public trust; on the contrary, if parliament cannot be seen to be scrutinising proposals with the thoroughness they deserve, public confidence in parliamentarians is likely to be further undermined"." Secondly, fast-tracking is perverse, given that the Committee on Standards in Public Life is due to report in the autumn. What if its recommendations—which party leaders have said, in advance, that they will accept—run counter to the provisions of the Bill? The Justice Secretary has claimed that the Bill creates the scheme for pay and allowances and that the committee will fill in the details of the scheme. The committee, justifiably in the light of the Prime Minister's invitation, believes that it is addressing the most appropriate scheme. This raises an obvious question. It was raised by Professor Dawn Oliver in her evidence to the Justice Committee in the other place. In commenting on Clause 3, she wrote: ""This clause assumes that there will be an allowance scheme. This pre-empts the CSPL recommendations, which might not recommend allowances but flat rated salaries instead"." Flat-rate salaries, as my noble and learned friend Lord Lyell has touched upon, would address the problem probably far more effectively than the provisions of the Bill. The question I put to Government is this: if this Bill becomes law before the recess and the Committee on Standards in Public Life makes recommendations that run counter to its provisions, what then do we do? The party leaders have signed up to implementing the committee's recommendations. Jack Straw appears to believe that the answer is to amend the Act. We enact it before the recess and we amend it in the autumn. Does anyone really believe that this will restore public confidence? Thirdly, fast-tracking the Bill is dangerous. This is the most important point. This, as has been so well argued already by noble Lords, is a public Bill with constitutional implications. Those implications have been drawn out in the memorandum of the Clerk of the House of Commons to the Justice Committee; in the memorandum of the Clerk of the Parliaments to the Constitution Committee of this House; and in the reports of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Constitution Committee. They are also clear from other evidence submitted to the Justice Committee in the other place. The Bill was hastily drafted and the constitutional implications not fully realised. When some of the implications became apparent, the Government accepted that one clause had to go. Another was removed by a vote of the House, even though there had been no opportunity to debate the clause and no opportunity to take account of its consequences. Indeed, as the Justice Secretary said after the vote and at the very end of Committee stage: ""I say to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed … that although we will not be able to do so on Report, we will take full account of the decision of the House in the consequential amendments in the other place".—[Official Report, Commons, 1/7/09; col. 387.]" So we have to look at the consequences of that change to the Bill. However, we also have to address the constitutional implications of the remaining clauses. The clauses that have been removed in the other place have not shed the Bill of constitutional implications, as we have already heard this afternoon. Anyone who believes that they have should read the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the memorandum of the Clerk of the Parliaments. There was no time in the Commons to consider all the issues raised by the Joint Committee. The chairman, Andrew Dismore, made clear that he expected that his Joint Committee colleagues in this House would pursue amendments similar to those tabled in the other place. In other words, there is a lot to be done on a Bill that, without thorough consideration, may have significant unintended consequences. As the Constitution Committee makes clear, the move towards greater external regulation, as provided for in the Bill, breaks with the principle of "exclusive cognisance" and has the potential, again as we have heard this afternoon, to give rise to conflict between Parliament and the courts. In the House on Monday evening, I drew attention to the fourth report of the Constitution Committee in the 2001-02 Session on the process of constitutional change. The committee took evidence from the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, who made clear that constitutional measures brought forward by government were subject to a rigorous process of preparation within government. He produced a diagram showing the process. He told the committee that, ""the devil is in the detail and I can assure you that we do work very intensively"." This Bill clearly departs from the process detailed by the noble and learned Lord. The devil most certainly is in the detail but there has not been the necessary intensive work prior to introduction. The Constitution Committee yesterday published a report detailing the steps that should be undertaken by government when proposing to fast-track legislation. Those steps have not been followed in respect of this Bill. Given that the Bill has not been brought in on the basis of consultation, within government or with anyone outside, and has been rushed through the other place in three days and is demonstrably incomplete, the onus falls on this House to ensure that it is subject to detailed examination. That point has been made by Members of the other place. Like my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew in his excellent speech, I, too, quote Dr Denis MacShane, the Member for Rotherham, during Committee stage of the Bill. He said: ""In my 15 years as a Labour Member of Parliament, who would like an elected second House, I never thought that I would say, as I say tonight, that I hope that the other place takes time and considers the matter carefully"." He added: ""The concern is cross-party—many of us are talking about the matter in the Tea Room and in the corridors".—[Official Report, Commons, 30/6/09; col. 211.]" The report of the Constitution Committee is clear. Its conclusion could not be more emphatic. It states that, ""we do not think that the case for proceeding with this bill on a fast-track timetable has been established and we do not support any curtailment of the usual legislative timetable"." I shall later invite the House to support that conclusion. This is a matter not for the political parties but for this House. There is an important principle at stake and I hope very much that the House will agree to uphold it.