Parliamentary Standards Bill

I am grateful, Mrs. Heal, for the opportunity to participate in the debate on what the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has said is possibly the heart of the Bill. I shall speak to amendments 18 to 21, which I tabled. The essence of this part of the Bill, as the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) has said, is the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which is not a matter of question in the House, as it has been fully accepted and agreed by the parties themselves as well as by the party leaders. What has been a cause for concern is the determination of privilege in this House, and particularly whether it should stay within its precincts or whether, in line with Congress in the US, it can be subordinated to the Supreme Court in that case, or to the courts of law in our case. It has always been my view that conveying parliamentary privileges to the courts for them to determine our actions, our speeches, our proceedings in Committee and the like not only destroys the essential pillar of our democracy—the pillar that protects to the Member of Parliament on the Floor of this House—but prevents a Member from seeking to defend the constituents who sent him here. The principle of redress would be somewhat diminished if our proceedings were to be interpreted elsewhere and a determination of them made elsewhere. That would certainly destroy the essence and basis of the House of Commons as we know it, which would do a great disservice to past generations and also to future generations of parliamentarians. I am grateful to Dr. Malcolm Jack and the Clerks for putting together a very important and significant document to deal with the problem. If I may, I will happily paraphrase liberally what it says. As I understand clause 8, which deals with enforcement, it raises a number of questions of principle relating to privilege. Clause 8(2) identifies recommendations to the Committee on Standards and Privileges that would be covered by parliamentary privilege, but if the Committee declined to act on a recommendation, it could presumably become the basis of legal proceedings in which the Commissioner, or someone else, sought to require the Committee to comply. In my humble and respectful submission, Mrs. Heal, it is not enough to argue that clause 8(2) speaks only of a recommendation, as the extent to which a reasonable recommendation should be accepted would itself become a matter for determination by the courts and a matter of interpretation. Clause 8(5) appears to make the exercise by the House of its disciplinary powers a matter of statute, since it seems to confer on the House a statutory permission to exercise those powers in the circumstances provided for in the subsection. If the circumstances in which the House may exercise disciplinary powers became a question of law, it would then be open to challenge before the courts. There are a number of examples that I could provide here, but I am aware of the guillotine on our proceedings and I would not wish to delay the Committee in its consideration of my amendments and others. It could be argued, however, that it is only the "failure" under clause 8(4) and no other, that may be punishable by the House. That would be a question requiring determination by the courts. Clause 8(6) requires IPSA to prepare a protocol on how IPSA, the Commissioner, the House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, and any other person whom IPSA considers appropriate, are going to work with each other. Given the various examples of the intervention of the police in our precincts and their involvement in politics over the last few years, I am not entirely sure that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis will be very enthusiastic about embracing that concept. I would not imagine, or dare to suppose, what the Director of Public Prosecutions would say to that, either. It is not clear to me whether this is meant to impose any obligation on any of the parties to observe the protocol. Again, this will be a question of law to be determined by the courts. If it imposes an obligation—and there seems little point in having such a protocol unless it does impose some sort of obligation—it raises the question of whether IPSA should be entitled to bind a Committee of the House as to how it is to conduct its own work. An analogous issue arises for the DPP in the exercise of his discretions as to whether proceedings should be fettered. I believe that there are dangers in this enforcement clause. It could lead to litigation, or constrain the House in the use of other sanctions that might be regarded as disciplinary. The issue of a formal reprimand and a formal requirement for an apology are within the powers of the House, but are not covered. The clause might also prevent the House from adopting other sanctions required by certain circumstances. The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield mentioned some of the sanctions currently available to the Committee on Standards and Privileges: for example, the ability to ban a Member from the use of certain facilities of the House. I intend my amendments to help the House to preserve its privileges and to avoid a determination of those privileges by the courts.