Parliamentary Standards Bill

We now come to what I think are the core clauses, and in my judgment they start to cause considerable difficulties. I hope that the Government will look constructively at ways of avoiding those difficulties, so that the Bill does what the public want—ensure that we are properly regulated, but not destroy the House's ability to be independent and to carry out its job properly on behalf of the electorate. The clause provides a mechanism of enforcement, and subsection (1) is completely uncontroversial. It provides that""IPSA may direct a member of the House of Commons—""(a) to repay…within a specified time an amount paid…under the…allowances"," and,""(b) to take any steps necessary to correct an omission or inaccuracy…in the (register of financial interests)."" I have concerns about subsection (2), however, which states that""IPSA may recommend to the House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges that the House should exercise any of its disciplinary powers in relation to a member of the House.""The IPSA may publish a recommendation that it has given."" It seems quite clear from the wording that IPSA will be able to make a specific recommendation to the Standards and Privileges Committee about how an hon. Member is dealt with in respect of a transgression. That, I assume, includes everything from an apology in the Chamber, through a suspension from the service of the House, to—the House has exercised this once since the second world war—the expulsion of a Member. The problem is that the Standards and Privileges Committee will then have to consider whether it agrees with IPSA's recommendation. If the Committee decides to agree, any public perception that it has been influenced by an outside body in reaching its own decision will be unfortunate. Of course, the Committee might decide for whatever reason that it wants to impose a different penalty, which need not be less severe than that which IPSA recommends. However, as the clause stands, it will embody in statute a specific reference to the Standards and Privileges Committee and to its powers, and they would then be judicially reviewable through the courts. The consequence of the Committee's powers being judicially reviewable through the courts goes to the absolute heart of Parliament's independence and what the Bill of Rights of 1689 was all about, given its insistence that what this Parliament does cannot be called into question elsewhere. From the current drafting of subsection (2), I really do not see how we can escape that conclusion. Indeed, it is noteworthy that witnesses who submitted either written or oral evidence to the Justice Committee stated very clearly that that outcome was undesirable. Professor Dawn Oliver said:""(2) may be omitted. The House would in any event be able to exercise its disciplinary powers under existing privilege rules."" In earlier evidence she expressed her deep concerns about the manner in which the House might proceed with a major constitutional change in respect of parliamentary privilege.