Parliamentary Standards Bill

That is exactly the point that I am making. We may or may not accept the Kelly recommendations; we have discretion on that. However, under the terms of the Bill, we have to accept the scheme brought forward by IPSA. To conclude the point that I was making, in another letter, dated 30 March, the Prime Minister went on to repeat the point about the breadth of the Kelly inquiry:""I am keen you should not feel bound in your discussions but free to consider a wide set of issues"." The Government could not have been clearer. The Kelly inquiry is looking into everything, including the structure of the allowances and the content of the scheme, yet we are legislating for such a scheme in the Bill. When pressed, the Justice Secretary conceded earlier today that future legislation might be required, so this is only an interim Bill. I think that he is already retreating from his earlier remarks, if I interpret his body language rightly, but they are on the record. He must concede that there is a conflict between setting up an inquiry into everything, as required by the Prime Minister, and prejudging that inquiry in a Bill that is being rushed through the House in a week. There is nothing that I can do to rescue the Government from that collision except try to throw the Bill out, which I tried to do yesterday by voting against it. However, through my amendment 56, I could at least prevent the House from having to accept the scheme of allowances that IPSA will bring forward under clause 3. It is required, under the Bill, to bring forward a scheme of allowances, and we do not have any say on it; we have to accept it. Again, there is a conflict between the Kelly inquiry findings, which we may or may not accept, and the terms of the Bill, which require the House to accept the scheme that the IPSA must present. I believe that the House must have the last word on such matters. That is desirable both because we are a sovereign Parliament and must decide the rules and be accountable for them, and because, as I have explained, that would give us discretion if the Kelly inquiry brought forward rules and suggestions that were incompatible with those that we have to accept from IPSA, under the Bill as drafted. That is why I ask the Government to accept amendment 56. My second amendment, 57, proposes that any scheme of allowances that is proposed, agreed and accepted by us should come into effect only after an election. As I mentioned yesterday on Second Reading, I borrowed the idea from the 27th amendment to the United States constitution. I will not weary the Committee with a long history of that amendment; it is a very long history. It took more than 200 years for that amendment finally to be ratified. It was first proposed in the 18th century. In essence, it prevents any change from being made to the pay and compensation of Senators and Representatives until after the next election. "Compensation" is the word used in the amendment to the constitution; it chiefly refers, I think, to salary, but its meaning could easily be extended to cover allowances and expenses. The amendment to the constitution requires that any such change should take effect only after the next intervening election. I think that we could adopt a similar system here. It would counter the charge that we are setting our own pay and allowances. As I have explained, I believe that the House ought to set such matters. A sovereign body should not transfer those matters to any other body. Under my amendment, we would not set pay and allowances for this Parliament and for ourselves; the change would take effect only after an election—after the implied endorsement of the electorate.