Parliamentary Standards Bill

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Parliamentary rights—and through those the rights of the people whom we represent—would be a better way to describe them. We are dealing today with potential statute law, and it will be the job of the courts to interpret it. The Bill is about how Parliament conducts itself, about its rights and, indeed, the powers of Committees. One feature of the Bill that has not been mentioned is that the proposed new authority will be able to interfere with our Committees. Clause 8(6) would require IPSA to produce a protocol regulating the behaviour of various bodies, including the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Standards and Privileges Committee. Such a protocol must presumably be binding in some way. I am not a member of that Committee, but I am a member of several others, and we abide by the Standing Orders of this House. We would resent it very much if an outside agency were to tell us how we should relate to other outside agencies, but that is what is in the Bill. IPSA must consult each of those bodies, including the Standards and Privileges Committee, but that is all. After that, its protocol would be binding. If it failed to bind, the courts would decide the matter, not this House. The Bill would export the powers of an important Committee of this House to an unelected, unaccountable quango. It is perhaps the final achievement of the quango state that we are setting up a quango to tell Parliament and its Committees what to do. Earlier in the debate, I was worried that all this had emerged from the usual channels. Certainly the Justice Secretary implied that large chunks of the Bill had been agreed. It has been accurately asserted in the past that the usual channels are among the most polluted waterways in the world. We can all agree that private discussions between parties are no substitute for open debate. It is also dangerous when political parties agree. We all remember the Child Support Agency, which was almost unopposed in this House but created immense problems. The implications and consequences of that legislation had not been properly discussed or understood. We also had the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Even if this were not a constitutional Bill, it would be very dangerous to try to push it through all its stages in less than a week. Of course everybody agrees that we must reform our expenses system, but that is happening—it is the whole point of the Kelly inquiry. Wisely, Sir Christopher Kelly is taking his time. When this issue was raised with the Justice Secretary, he said that the Kelly inquiry was much narrower. He said that it was simply concerned with setting up a system of expenses, and that the wider considerations about who should make the rules and administer and police the system were for this Bill. That was not the understanding when the Prime Minister, in desperation, set up the inquiry and wrote to Sir Christopher on 30 March. He wrote:""It will of course be for you as an independent Committee to consider how you wish to proceed. I am keen you should not feel bound in your discussions but free to consider a wide set of issues"." He then lists certain items that he wishes Sir Christopher to consider. The terms of reference of the inquiry are, therefore, extremely wide.