Parliamentary Standards Bill

It is an honour to follow the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young), the Chairman of the Standards and Privileges Committee. I have served on the Committee for eight years, and I am by a long way the longest-serving member on the Government side of the House. I much endorse what he said about the Bill and the questions that he raised. Also, the intervention by the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) on my right hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) about his self-incriminatory statement to the House, which currently enjoys privilege, but would not do so if the Bill went through, was very telling. I want to raise issues relating to my role as the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, particularly those matters relating to due process. As the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire and others have said, the legislative timetable for the Bill is highly problematic because it makes it virtually impossible for Committees such as the Joint Committee on Human Rights to perform our important role of subjecting Government Bills to careful scrutiny and reporting to Parliament in time to inform the debate. While I understand the political imperative to act swiftly in response to widespread and acute public concern about the present system of allowances and the regulation of standards, public confidence in the institution of Parliament is the lifeblood of our democracy. There is therefore a certain irony that a measure designed to restore public confidence in Parliament is being rushed on to the statute book in a way that makes it impossible for it to receive the proper scrutiny and deliberation that such an important measure deserves by the very institution in which we wish to restore public confidence. I shall turn to the issue of due process. A significant human rights question raised by the Bill is whether it provides sufficient safeguards to enable it to be compatible with the right of Members to a fair hearing under long-standing common law principles of natural justice that are now also incorporated and developed in article 6 of the European convention on human rights and in our own law, through the Human Rights Act 1998. It is often erroneously observed that human rights are only about unpopular causes. At present, there is probably no more unpopular a cause than ourselves in this context. Nevertheless, when subject to disciplinary proceedings, hon. Members are entitled to the same protection of due process as anyone else in the outside world. The explanatory notes to the Bill acknowledge that the provisions might engage the right to a fair hearing under article 6. However, the Government argue that there is no incompatibility with article 6, for two reasons. First, the explanatory notes state that""there are arguments that the direction or recommendation functions of the IPSA do not involve the determination of civil rights or obligations."" Secondly, the notes state that, even if IPSA's functions of giving directions or making recommendations determined a Member's civil rights, so that article 6 applied, there is no incompatibility with the article because there is""a range of safeguards in place to ensure the fairness of the procedures of the IPSA."" I have carefully considered the Government's analysis of the Bill's compatibility with the right to a fair hearing under article 6, and I have to say that I do not agree with their analysis. However, because of the timetable, I have not had a chance to engage in correspondence with the Government, as I would normally do as Chair of the Joint Select Committee on behalf of my Committee, to discuss the issues and thrash out the arguments in detail. The Government's view that article 6(1) of the convention does not apply to the disciplining of Members is untenable in the light of the very serious consequences that might result for the individual concerned. The available sanctions include expulsion from the House, suspension, the withholding of salary and the ordering of the repayment of money. Any of those sanctions could also have a serious impact on the Member's reputation. That was expressly recognised by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege in 1999, when it stated that""in a particularly serious case a member faces the prospect of suspension and significant financial loss and, which may be more worrying for him, the destruction of his political career."" Indeed, we have seen that happen in recent cases before the Standards and Privileges Committee. The Joint Committee went on:""Even when a member is not suspended, the electorate may react adversely to his conduct as revealed during investigation of the complaint made against him."" The Committee on Standards in Public Life, in its eighth report in 2002, also recognised the serious consequences for an accused Member. As Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, it is my view that article 6(1) of the convention applies to the disciplining of Members by the House of Commons. Sometimes the nature of the allegation will be such that its determination amounts to the determination of a criminal charge—for example, when the complaint is that the Member has acted fraudulently. In such cases, the criminal limb of article 6 will apply, complete with its higher procedural protections. In other cases in which the allegations are less serious, a Member's civil rights will be determined by the proceedings, particularly in view of the seriousness of the consequences for the Member concerned. Not only will this often have financial consequences for the Member, which in today's Strasbourg case law is often seen as sufficient to qualify as a civil right, but it will always have serious consequences for the Member's reputation and might affect their ability to pursue their livelihood. The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege pointed out in its reports that several witnesses had drawn its attention to the application of article 6, including Lord Bingham, the then recently retired senior Law Lord who was then Lord Chief Justice. The Government argue that, even if the right to a fair hearing as stipulated in article 6 applies—as I say, it does—the procedural safeguards in the Bill are sufficient. However, the only procedural safeguard in the Bill is the right of a Member who is the subject of an investigation or complaint to make representations to the commissioner and to IPSA about that investigation or complaint. That falls well short of the set of safeguards that the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege described as the "minimum requirements of fairness". It also falls well short of what is required by article 6, and of the common law principles of natural justice set out in case law going back over decades. The Joint Committee concluded, in the light of the seriousness of the consequences for a Member, that it is important that the procedures followed in the investigation and adjudication of complaints should match contemporary standards of fairness. The Committee stated:""While fairness is fundamental to any disciplinary procedure, the more serious the consequences, the more extensive must be the safeguards…In dealing with specially serious cases, we consider it is essential that committees of both Houses should follow procedures providing safeguards at least as rigorous as those applied in the courts and professional disciplinary bodies."" The Committee is trying to create a system that somehow mirrors the way in which outside professional bodies are regulated. We should have the same safeguards and procedures as those that are expected for outside bodies such as the British Medical Association, the Law Society or the Bar Council. Those principles are set out in common law, in article 6 and in the Joint Committee's report, which includes reference to a""prompt and clear statement of the precise allegations against the Member…adequate opportunity to take legal advice and have legal assistance throughout…the opportunity to be heard in person…the opportunity to call relevant witnesses at the relevant ""time…the opportunity to examine other witnesses…the opportunity to attend meetings at which evidence is given, and to receive transcripts of evidence."" None of that is in the Bill as it stands, but it is all required under long-standing principles of our law, as laid down by the courts and, more recently, by article 6. It is required by public bodies generally.