Political Parties and Elections Bill

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for these amendments. I believe that what I am about to say will cover the individual inquiries of each of the noble Lords. Amendment 23 would amend Clause 6, which sets out the number of electoral commissioners. Currently, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 provides that there should be, ""not less than five, but not more than nine Electoral Commissioners"." Clause 6 of the Bill seeks to increase the minimum number from five to nine, and the maximum from nine to 10. It may be helpful if I explain the rationale behind the number of electoral commissioners in Clause 6. The increase in the minimum number of commissioners is intended to ensure that commissioners with political backgrounds—nominated commissioners—will always be in a minority on the commission as a whole. That is four out of nine. The increase in the maximum number to 10 is to ensure sufficient room to appoint a full complement of four nominated commissioners in the event of there being six electoral commissioners, as is currently the case. This amendment seeks to alter Clause 6, to require that the commission have exactly nine commissioners at all times. I must resist the amendment as it is unnecessarily restrictive and could hamper our policy intent, which is to ensure, in line with the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, that there should be four commissioners with recent political experience drawn from across the political spectrum. Moreover, given that there are currently six electoral commissioners, this amendment would prevent the appointment of four commissioners with recent political experience. If the current number of other electoral commissioners fell to five, enabling the appointment of four nominated commissioners, we feel that there would be an increased likelihood of these nominated commissioners achieving parity with others on the board. So, if, for example, the post of one of the other electoral commissioners became vacant, reducing the total number of electoral commissioners to eight, there would be the same number of nominated commissioners as other electoral commissioners. We have always made it clear that we believe that it is important to seek to ensure that nominated commissioners are in a minority on the commission at all times. This is also in line with the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. Our intention is that these nominated commissioners bring their political experience to bear in the commission’s work, and so help it to become a more effective and credible regulator. However, ensuring that they are always in a minority is intended to prevent any perception of politicisation of the commission. Further, this amendment would remove any flexibility by always requiring the commission to have exactly nine commissioners. Potentially, it would take just the departure, for whatever reason, of one commissioner for the commission to fall short of the statutory requirement of nine commissioners. While we note that Schedule 1 to the PPER Act 2000 provides that the validity of any proceedings of the commission shall not be affected by any vacancy among members of the commission, we see no advantage in setting an inflexible number of nine commissioners. The Electoral Commission has also commented in its briefing note on the Bill that such an amendment is undesirable. For the reasons I have given, we believe that a requirement for nine or 10 electoral commissioners achieves a reasonable balance, ensuring enough room to appoint the full complement of four nominated commissioners, who are within a minority, and allowing for the appointment of five or six other electoral commissioners. The noble Lord has already indicated that he is not going to press this amendment. However, I hope that I have given him the background that he seeks and that I have placed it on the record. I turn now to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. This seeks to amend Clause 7, which sets out the political restrictions on electoral commissioners and staff. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 currently imposes a 10-year restriction on previous political activity for all Electoral Commission staff. Clause 7 of this Bill reduces the restriction period from 10 years to five years for the commission’s chief executive, and to 12 months for all other staff. The amendment would increase the 12-month restriction period on previous political activity for all of the commission, apart from the chief executive, to 36 months. The noble Lord tabled an identical amendment in Grand Committee. I gathered from the informative debate that we had on the issue at the time—and perhaps my response was out of exhaustion more than any intent to be less than polite—that his concern is that a one-year minimum political restriction period is too short for any member of the staff at the commission, and so should be increased to three years. I share the noble Lord’s concern to the extent that I acknowledge that there may be a small number of posts in the commission, other than the chief executive, that merit a requirement for a longer restriction from political activity than one year. However, I do not agree that we should impose a blanket minimum restriction period of three years on all staff. For the majority of commission posts, I firmly believe that a one-year restriction will be appropriate. It is important to note that the Electoral Commission, which has a better knowledge of what the duties of posts at the commission involve than anyone, shares this view. For posts deemed suitable by the chief executive, he will be able to designate them as being subject to a longer restriction period of up to five years, taking into account the seniority of the post, and—crucially—the likelihood of the person dealing with politically sensitive matters. I note the noble Lord’s comments during Grand Committee that, although a person may not be in a politically sensitive role all the time—for example, staff at a more junior level—they could dip in and out of out of politically sensitive activities and so be in a position to gain access to sensitive information. Therefore, they may not be subject to a designation even if they merit it. In the light of that, he believes that a basic threshold of three years, instead of one year, for all staff is preferable to a longer restriction of period for senior staff only. While I appreciate the reasoning behind the noble Lord’s argument, I emphasise that the chief executive’s power to designate is not restricted to a particular level of posts. The chief executive will be best placed to determine whether a person’s access to sensitive material is such that the post should merit a longer restriction. Overall, the proposal to reduce the restriction on past political experience for commission staff has been welcomed during the passage of the Bill to date. This warm welcome is in recognition of the overly restrictive rules that apply at present, and the fact that the recommendations of the CSPL and others for equipping the commission better to understand the field it regulates resonate with many people. In its briefing note ahead of today’s debate, the commission recognises that the formulation in the Bill is appropriate and workable. A blanket provision requiring a 36-month period is unduly inflexible and imposes an unnecessarily long restriction on the majority of staff of the commission. I hope that the noble Lord will now feel able not to move his amendment. On Amendment 25, and recognising its purpose of teasing out the posts to which this might apply, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 currently imposes a 10-year restriction on previous political activity for all Electoral Commission staff. Clause 7 of this Bill reduces the restriction period from 10 to five years for the commission's chief executive, and to one year for all other staff. Noble Lords will recall that government amendments in Grand Committee sought to provide the chief executive of the commission with the power to designate certain other commission posts as being subject to longer restricted periods of between two and five years. Before he decides to designate a post, the chief executive must reasonably believe that it is necessary to do so in order to maintain public confidence in the effectiveness of the commission in carrying out its functions. In addition, when determining the length of the proposed designation, the chief executive must take into account the seniority of the post and, crucially, the likelihood that the person holding the post will have to deal with politically sensitive matters. Once these decisions have been made, the chief executive would be required to consult the Speaker's Committee on the posts that he intends to designate and take heed of its views. These government amendments were intended to address the concerns raised by the commission and my noble friend Lady Gould that the five-year restriction should be capable of being extended to other senior posts in the commission, or those dealing with politically sensitive responsibilities. They made the valid point that a one-size-fits-all policy might not be appropriate here. Amendment 25 seeks to remove the chief executive's power to designate posts, and thereby prevent the chief executive of the commission from increasing the one-year restriction period on previous political activity for other commission posts. We are bound to resist this amendment, as it removes the flexibility for the chief executive of the commission to determine the appropriate restricted period for its staff within the parameters that the Bill sets. Having heard representations on the subject, we appreciate that there may be a small number of posts in the commission, other than the chief executive, which merit a requirement for a longer restriction on recent political activity than one year. I emphasise that the underlying theme of the reduced political restrictions in Clause 7 is to enable the commission to recruit staff with relevant experience of the environment that they regulate. A power for the chief executive to designate posts is not intended to detract from this underlying theme. It is right that we strike an appropriate balance between ensuring that the commission is able to employ those who have the necessary skills to enable it to be more effective and creating any perception of politicising the commission. For these reasons, a power for the chief executive to designate certain posts as subject to a longer restricted period is justified. The commission has emphasised that the power is important, and will enable its chief executive to designate longer restrictions from previous political activity to a handful of posts dealing directly with regulatory activities, policy or boundary decisions, which may include matters of significant sensitivity. The chief executive will also take into account the extent to which recent party-political activity may be perceived by others to compromise the impartiality of the post. Examples of posts that the commission has indicated that the chief executive may designate include, among others, the deputy chief executive, director of party and election finance, the director of electoral administration and boundaries, and the heads of the commission’s Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland offices. Listing those posts does not detract from the chief executive’s responsibility to consider other posts where there is particular political sensitivity. The chief executive of the commission would designate these posts on the basis of deputising for the chief executive, or the political sensitivities of the posts. The chief executive of the commission will be best placed to decide which posts merit a longer restriction period, and what that period should be. That is why the Bill does not impose a blanket longer restriction on all senior posts. Some senior posts may merit a longer restriction period, while others will not. Likewise, some relatively junior posts may merit designation. Having said that, we appreciate the valid concerns that the power should not provide the chief executive with an unfettered discretion to designate posts for a longer restriction period. It is for this reason that the power sets out specific tests that the chief executive must believe have been met, and factors which he must take into account before he designates a post; for example, the seniority of the post, and how likely it is that any holder of the post will be required to deal with politically sensitive matters. These criteria show that we are mindful that the chief executive should use this power responsibly. The power also includes a further check on the discretion provided here through the inclusion of a requirement for the chief executive to consult the Speaker's Committee on the posts that he intends to designate. A duty to consult will mean that any view put forward by the committee in relation to a proposed designation will have to be taken into account, and taken seriously, by the chief executive. I reiterate that the commission does not envisage that this designation would apply to more than a handful of posts within the staff body, and in each case the commission would consider the merits of the case for designation. Additionally, the commission will publish information regarding the designation of posts on an annual basis. With the steps that we have taken to ensure that the power to designate is used appropriately, I hope that we have reassured the noble Lord and that he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.