Political Parties and Elections Bill

My Lords, I start with an apology. I said that I would write to the Committee, giving examples of where we felt that it might be preferable to leave offences to be dealt with by criminal law rather than by the new civil sanctions. Regrettably, this letter did not go out until last week. It was e-mailed to the noble Lord’s office, the Whips’ Office, on Friday. It did not go out before then because of the significant pressures involved in readying government amendments. I am sorry that a copy did not arrive in the noble Lord’s hands until last night. I am glad to have the opportunity—I am grateful to him—to outline our approach in the House. I am sorry that the noble Lord has not been able to read my long letter to him. If he had managed to get to the second page, there are a couple of examples of where we think that a criminal sanction is appropriate. Now that I am on my feet, let me say a little more. I will move straight to the examples mentioned by the noble Lord. The new range of civil sanctions should be applicable to the vast majority of offences contained in the 2000 Act. They represent a proportionate and flexible approach to enforcement and should remedy the current situation whereby the enforcement choices range from criminal investigation at one end of the spectrum to, effectively, nothing at the other. This point was made with force in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, who is unfortunately absent—we wish him well. We know that there is a strong consensus that the current situation is not satisfactory. Some offences are more serious than a mere administrative error, and it would be more appropriate to reserve these breaches for the criminal sphere only. For instance, where there is a deliberate attempt to undermine the 2000 Act on a significant scale, it could be that allowing only for the possibility of a criminal sanction is the appropriate approach, in keeping with the gravity of the offence. This would also send a clear deterrent signal about the most serious offences in the earlier PPERA Act. Nothing in the Bill should detract from our overriding objective that compliance with the law is vital in the context of public confidence in our democratic systems. I shall give a couple of examples of where reserving certain offences for the criminal sphere might be more appropriate. Section 61(2)(a) of PPERA makes it an offence knowingly to give the treasurer of a party false information about donations. This is an example of where the basis of the offence is a deliberate and wilful attempt to mislead over the facts of a donation, as opposed to an administrative oversight or error. Also under Section 61(2)(a), it is an offence to withhold from a treasurer information about donations with intent to deceive. Additionally, we believe that where an individual or organisation deliberately attempts to conceal evidence or intentionally hinder an investigation by the commission, this behaviour may require the strong deterrent of criminal prosecution. For example, Section 148(1) of PPERA relates to the altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying of documents relating to the financial affairs of supervised organisations or individuals, and Section 148(2)(b) makes it an offence knowingly to supply false information when purporting to comply with a request to provide information. In such cases where an administrative error in itself is not the offence but rather the wilful or malicious attempt to destroy or otherwise conceal evidence, it may be more appropriate that the deterrent and the enforcement are criminal. I stress that these are examples: this is not a full list of the offences that may remain only in the criminal sphere. We will bring that forward when we make the statutory instrument under this clause. Noble Lords may wish to note that it was originally the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life that, apart from providing for new sanctions for use by the commission, the most severe offences should remain purely in the criminal sphere. If these amendments, which I am grateful to the noble Lord for describing as "probing", were passed, they would prevent us from providing for this option, or at least debating the pros and cons of this or other approaches as part of the debate on the statutory instrument. I hope that I have explained in rather more detail than I was able to give in Committee what kind of offences we think should remain only in the criminal sphere.