My Lords, I had some sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Steel, when he told us last year that he was elected as a spokesman for a group of people at a meeting at which he was not present but I say to him that I have changed my mind. He loves what he is doing and he would probably have volunteered for the job had he been in the room. I think that he is trying to out-do the author Richmal Crompton. Those who in future will research reform of the House of Lords will need to plough through the Steel Bill, the More Steel Bill, the Steel Bill Again and doubtless when this Bill fails, we will, in the next Session, have Steel Bill the Fourth and, after that, Still the Steel Bill. I look forward to taking part in all of those.
As noble Lords know, I disliked the Bill last year. It did not get very far in Committee. I disagree with my noble and learned friend Lord Howe of Aberavon that it has been through the mill; it certainly has not. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Steel, that reform of the House should not be done by a Back-Bench Bill, however well intentioned but flawed. Any reform should be a government measure.
I shall start with Part 4. The noble Lord, Lord Steel, said that its purpose is to bring us into line with another place. That has not yet been discussed in Committee. Many believe that a person who has paid his dues to society should not be penalised again. We are different from another place—we are not salaried—and the fact that they do something does not necessarily mean that we must do it too.
Part 2 breaks a fundamental plank of the agreement reached in 1999. We were promised that the removal of hereditary Peers would occur only after stage 2 of reform. This Bill is not stage 2. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that that is a matter of fundamental principle to me. It should not be broken by a Back-Bench Bill.
Before I turn to the detail of Part 1, we should have a look at the question of whether to put the commission for appointments on a statutory basis before we have thoroughly assessed the current Appointments Commission, how it has worked and where its weaknesses are. I note that the current commission vets all nominations for peerages, including those of political parties, for propriety. I cannot find that in this Bill.
I turn to more detailed points. It is easy—dare I say usual?—for Liberal Democrats such as the noble Lord, Lord Steel, to ignore the political disadvantages that would affect Conservative and Cross-Bench Peers if Part 2 came into effect. Interestingly, if it had been in effect since 1999, the composition of the House would already be in breach of Clause 8(2)(c). There would be 216 Labour Peers and 192 Conservative Peers—a Labour majority of 24—which is over the 3 per cent provided for in relation to the House’s total composition, which would have been 721 without the by-elections.
Would the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, who I am delighted to see in his place—I never quite understood that the first qualification for the post that he holds should be that the postholder should never attend the House—have to get his calculator out every time a Labour or Conservative Peer died? Had Part 2 been put into place in 1999, which two Labour Peers would be forced out today to correct the illegal representation? Would it indeed be on an electoral basis, such as the hereditary Peers suffered in 1999? Or would the noble Lord, Lord Jay, have got on the line to the Prime Minister and told him in his best diplomatic voice that he could not have the noble Lord, Lord Myners, or the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, because the Labour Benches were full? That would be a good story. We can imagine what spin the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, might have put on it.
But, with the best will in the world, who is the chairman of an unelected commission, however eminent, to tell the elected Prime Minister that he cannot advise Her Majesty that he would have at his side in a world crisis the person he wants? Some noble Lords may argue that it would not work like this. It may be that some old boy or girl could be found to make way, like they do in the other place, but what would they be offered?
Let me take the specific case of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, who was appointed by the Appointments Commission and transferred to the Labour Benches, as he is entitled to do and where he is doing a very good job; I have no disagreement with that. However, if the House were illegally constituted, as is required by the Bill, and the Government won a vote by one in this House in which, for example, the Cross-Bench Peers, as a result of a case like that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, had dropped below 20 per cent or in which it had a bigger majority than is allowed for in the Bill, how would we stop someone going to the courts to challenge the legitimacy of the vote? Would the government proceedings be suspended? Could no more legislation be enacted? This part of the Bill is a recipe for allowing the courts to intervene in the internal privileges of our House, and it is a very retrograde step to start codifying it all in this way. What might a Supreme Court say?
We will discuss the Bill, if it goes to Committee, in some detail. It is a House of Lords reform Bill and there will be, just like last time, a considerable number of amendments.
House of Lords Bill [HL]
Proceeding contribution from
Earl of Caithness
(Conservative)
in the House of Lords on Friday, 27 February 2009.
It occurred during Debate on bills on House of Lords Bill [HL].
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2008-09Chamber / Committee
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