Planning Bill

This variation was required in order to be able to provide the modernisation and extension of Thameslink. In Article 12 of the said order, there was also provision, "““to release Network Rail from any obligation under section 9 of the South Eastern Railway Act 1896 to provide, maintain or light a footway in the London borough of Lewisham. Part of the footway in question had not existed for many years, being submerged under other developments, and the remainder was blocked off””." That is the nature of the decisions we are talking about in terms of the variation of existing statutory powers. To say that decisions of this kind—ones which are essential, but variations to what are to a significant degree private Acts of Parliament that were in effect planning consents for the establishment of the original infrastructure of the railways—cannot be varied without recourse in each individual case to the Secretary of State frankly makes a nonsense of the IPC regime as it is intended to be: a single development consent regime. I have developed that argument at some length. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, has asked whether we could have some form of oversight or protection in respect of the model clauses to ensure that they are used for what I think he and I agree are perfectly reasonable purposes and not a Henry VIII-type process that might go wider. I understand his point, but in the time we have been able to devote to it so far, it is difficult to see how that would work. It would require the Secretary of State in each case to make a judgment about whether a provision fell within the model clauses and was reasonable in the circumstances or went beyond them. Our fear is that, if we go down that road, it would require the Secretary of State to substitute his judgment for that of the IPC in respect of each individual application of the power to vary statutory provisions. That would defeat the whole purpose of the IPC in this respect. I am happy to continue looking at the issue, but I need to be frank with the noble Lord and the House and say that the attention we have given to it so far does not offer a credible way forward; that is, one that does not simply superimpose on the IPC a whole new review process with all that goes with it and which would fall to the Secretary of State. Our judgment continues to be that in the light of the safeguards I have set out—all powers must be applied for and considered in public, they must be based on model provisions set out by the Secretary of State, they cannot authorise by-laws and offences, decision-makers would be bound to decide in accordance with government policy as set out in national policy statements, and the provisions in Clause 119 in respect of the powers of the Secretary of State where orders appear to contradict EC or ECHR law—the powers are moderate and reasonable in the circumstances, and indeed essential if the IPC is to operate a single consent regime. That is the position we have reached, but if further enlightenment comes to us, I would be happy to communicate with the noble Lord. However, I do not want to raise hopes that we can provide a way through this. We believe that that would be hard to achieve without unpicking a central feature of the IPC. I therefore ask the House to stand by the clause as it is.