Planning Bill

Yes, they will indeed, my Lords. They will have legal effect, but they are not legislation in the way that I am using the term. There are several fundamental reasons why I believe that parliamentary approval for national policy statements is inappropriate. This is a perverse proposition as it would undermine one of our key aims for the Bill, which is to ensure and make clear ministerial accountability for policy. While we have created a new dimension for parliamentary scrutiny, to give Parliament the final responsibility for determining the policy is to move in the other direction completely. Secondly, to take a wider view—a view that my noble friends have powerfully argued—it would also represent a significant and destabilising shift in the historic and fundamental relationship between the Executive and the legislature. It alters the balance; it undermines the clear and understood separation of roles that have been established over many years. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, not only for her speech but for her support. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, referred to Parliament as the place where law is made. Indeed, as I said, the problem is that national policy statements are not primary or secondary legislation. Other noble Lords have pointed to a paradox: we have created a very thorough process for parliamentary scrutiny of extremely complex and technical issues. The right place for that is the Select Committees, as the noble Baroness said. Where the committees recommend that both Houses will have had a debate, the outcome will also have to be taken into account by government. What is it that a binding vote will do other than introduce a real uncertainty that, despite scrutiny and public consultation, the policy might still be overturned on a vote of both Houses? My noble friend Lord Woolmer was extremely eloquent on this point. Uncertainty is the enemy of everything we are trying to achieve, with the support of so many noble Lords. Noble Lords argued in Committee that there may be a precedent for parliamentary approval in similar circumstances, such as guidance from the Lord Chancellor to the Judicial Appointments Commission under the Constitutional Reform Act. We have no parallels with the NPSs; these are wholly new policy statements. If we took the step proposed by the amendments, it would be extremely unclear where we would end up. Indeed, I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, made that perfectly clear. We do not want to begin walking a path that leads to calls for votes on the next White Paper on health or education. I say that in all seriousness to noble Lords opposite, given their ambitions for government. The noble Lord opposite also demolished his own argument. Noble Lords do not need reminding that if both Houses were to have a binding vote on whether to accept an NPS, practical difficulties would occur if they took opposing views. It is difficult to see how such a situation could be resolved, given that we would not be voting on primary or delegated legislation. It would be unprecedented and unbounded territory. There is already division on the Conservative Benches about how it would work out. The noble Lord has said that the unelected House might have the right to overturn the elected House in this respect, which is extremely dangerous territory. This question was considered and debated at length on Report in the other place. An amendment to make NPSs subject to parliamentary approval was defeated by a clear majority of 54 votes. While the role of Select Committees and enhanced scrutiny was warmly welcomed, amendments for a binding parliamentary vote were soundly defeated. The elected House has already rejected the idea of a binding vote. It is surely wrong for this House to overturn that. This House has many responsibilities, but they do not include telling the other House how to conduct its business. The noble Lord’s Amendment No. 35 would remove subsections (4) to (7) of Clause 9. The procedures for parliamentary scrutiny so carefully worked out in another place would thereby come to nothing. I repeat that it is simply not appropriate for this House to dictate to the other House how to conduct its business. For all these reasons, it would not be right to accept Amendments Nos. 34 and 35. They would bring chaos and uncertainty to the system, and undermine some of the fundamental principles of the workings of government. We have a better way, which we propose in our amendment and which more properly enables this House to make its unique and greatest contribution. Noble Lords have spoken about the importance of a committee of this House being able to examine the draft NPSs in detail, particularly in light of the expertise that exists here. That case has been persuasively and eloquently put, and I believe in it passionately. I have therefore tabled government Amendment No. 36, which would amend Clause 9(4)(b) so that the Secretary of State would be required to lay before Parliament a statement setting out her response to a committee of either House. That would give this House a strong and clear role in the parliamentary scrutiny process. It would give a committee of this House a role similar to that of committees in the other place. Without prejudice to any decisions that Parliament or the authorities of this House might make about the exact arrangements, it would mean, in essence, that an NPS could be examined by committees in each House. I believe that this meets what many noble Lords were after. It improves and strengthens parliamentary scrutiny of draft NPSs. It recognises the unique contribution and strengths of this House. It will mean that our expertise will be applied in a way that fits with the traditional role of this House—we are, after all, a scrutinising Chamber. It will mean also that it will be applied in a way that fits the nature of what will be complex, technical documents, ensuring that we make a contribution to those documents and policies in the most effective way. I hope that noble Lords will agree with me.