Planning Bill

I shall speak, first, to the government amendments in this group. Amendment No. 443ZA has been brought forward in response to concerns about the reserve powers that the Secretary of State would have to intervene in the way charging authorities set, collect and apply CIL. Representations have been made about the wide nature of the Secretary of State’s delegated powers and we have listened to those. The amendment therefore seeks to remove the regulation powers for the Secretary of State to provide herself with intervention powers over CIL-charging authorities. The noble Earl, Lord Caithness, has indicated that he intends to oppose the question that Clause 206 should stand part of the Bill. Following this amendment, Clause 206 would contain only a power for the Secretary of State to give guidance on any matter connected with CIL. I hope that that does not warrant a stand part debate and, on that basis, that the noble Earl will not oppose Clause 206 standing part of the Bill. Government Amendment No. 444C provides for amendments to be made to four Acts of Parliament so that CIL can function effectively and efficiently. Under proposed new subsection (1) in the amendment, Section 101(6) of the Local Government Act 1972 would be amended to provide that CIL is not a rate for the purposes of the subsection. Section 101 allows for, among other things, the delegation of functions within a local authority to its committees, sub-committees and officers. Section 101(6) disapplies Section 101 for the purposes of functions with respect to levying a rate. To avoid any question about whether CIL is a rate for the purposes of the Local Government Act, the amendment provides that CIL is not to be considered a rate for Section 101(6). Section 38 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 allows the Mayor of London to delegate functions. In particular, Section 38(2) allows the mayor to delegate his functions not only to the deputy mayor and any member of the staff of the Greater London Authority but also to the London Development Agency, the Common Council of the City of London and local authorities. The effect of proposed new subsection (2A) in the new clause is that the mayor may not delegate his CIL function to the latter three bodies. There is a restriction in Section 9(8) of the Norfolk and Suffolk Broads Act 1998 which means that the Broads Authority may delegate functions in relation to its navigation area only to its navigation committee. Proposed new subsection (3) would mean that the Broads Authority would be able to delegate CIL functions, within its powers to delegate, to someone else should it so wish to do. Finally, Section 71(1)(c) of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 prevents a Minister making an order for the contracting out of, "““a power or right of entry, search or seizure into or of any property””." Exceptions are made to that in Section 71(3) relating to the enforcement of things such as non-domestic rates and water charges. The amendment provides a similar exception for CIL purposes. Government Amendment No. 460 is concerned with the commencement of two sets of provisions in Part 11. The effect of Amendment No. 460 would be that in Clause 199 and the consequential amendments provided for in a new clause by Amendment No. 444C are to come into force by a commencement order by the Secretary of State. Amendment No. 443, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Reay, seeks to provide that the CIL regulations create a new offence when an applicant for development consent seeks to influence the decision by the consenting authority by offering what are called ““improper donations””. I reassure him that government policy is extremely clear on this issue; it is a fundamental principle of the planning system that planning permission cannot be bought or sold. I know there is some concern—he has quoted the CPRE evidence—about the influence of benefits offered by some wind farms. The question turns in part upon what is a material consideration relevant to a decision to grant planning permission for a particular development. That is a matter of both law and fact. It must be something that is about the development in question and the use of land, but in an individual case it will depend on the facts. The problem with the amendment is that it means that if a developer gets that difficult judgment wrong, they will have committed an offence, and that is obviously not right. A planning authority is already acting unlawfully if it gives an unreasonable amount of weight to something in reaching a decision, or gives weight to something that is not a material consideration. If it does so, its decisions are potentially subject to judicial review or to investigation by the Local Government Ombudsman. I strongly believe that that is right and we should not alter the situation. I know that is a disappointing reply for the noble Lord, but I hope he can remove his amendment on that basis.