I do not know the answer to that; it would depend a bit on the scope of the original application. I should like to think about that because there are some significant implications there.
I turn to the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin. We have had a related debate on the role of judicial review at different points in our consideration of the Bill and I am sure that he will remember the arguments that we have put forward. He has asked me a slightly broader question: why, as I understand it, we are not providing for an appeal mechanism under the other arrangements that we have. The answer is that we have created a process that is very thorough and is iterative at all stages. When we come to the decision that is made by the IPC, we do not think that at that point it makes sense to create an opportunity for a right of appeal that would reopen the process and would involve the appellant body standing in the shoes of the original decision-maker. Throughout this process we are trying to create something that is rather different from anything we have had before, and which is thorough and robust. We believe, therefore, that judicial review is the best and most appropriate step after that.
The noble Lord also asked about the timetable. He will know that one of our concerns is about creating a process which can be trusted because it is transparent and thorough but which also removes unnecessary delays. The six-week deadline for filing a claim form is, I believe, reasonable, because it will come at the end of a process which has been unusually thorough and different from what we have in the planning system at the moment. We are intent on making sure that those processes are fair. The six-week time limit for putting in a claim will not come out of the blue; there will be issues which will have been very well rehearsed and attitudes which will have been taken, and I think that the timetable is appropriate. However, it is not an entirely new provision: the six-week time limit for challenges is similar to that which currently exists for statutory challenges to certain development control decisions taken by the Secretary of State under the TCPA. We are not creating a new process, as there is a relevant precedent.
Finally, government Amendments Nos. 344 and 345 will remove the need for orders granting development consent to be made under the seal of the commission or the Secretary of State. On reflection, we do not think that orders need to be made under seal, and SIs are not generally made under seal. As such, we do not think it would be sensible to require this in the Bill. However, it remains the case that the IPC may enter into deeds which, by law, still need to be made under seal in the case of a body corporate. The Bill therefore retains the provision relating to seals in paragraph 23 of Schedule 1.
Amendment No. 345 will also remove the requirement for interested parties to be sent a copy of the order granting development consent. We believe that that would quite simply be an unnecessary expense; interested parties will already receive a copy of the decision letter and statement of reasons under Clause 112.
Planning Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Baroness Andrews
(Labour)
in the House of Lords on Monday, 20 October 2008.
It occurred during Committee of the Whole House (HL)
and
Debate on bills on Planning Bill.
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