UK Parliament / Open data

Political Parties and Elections Bill

It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Sir Peter Viggers)—and, indeed, to follow the hon. Member for Battersea (Martin Linton). It occurs to me that there is nothing to prevent a Labour candidate or MP from doing exactly the same as the Conservatives have done in respect of Lord Ashcroft. However, I shall ignore that issue for most of my speech. Instead, I wish to raise some issues regarding elements of the Bill, and also to mention one issue that has been omitted. The new powers to be awarded to the Electoral Commission are of concern to me. I believe that some of the civil sanctions that the commission would be able to exercise following the enactment of the Bill may prove unacceptable in practice. Paragraph 10 of proposed new schedule 19B to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 allows the commission to impose so-called stop notices. These are to be imposed on individuals to prohibit them from carrying on an activity which the commission believes is ““likely to involve”” their committing an offence under the 2000 Act. The wording implies not ““has done””, but merely ““may do””. Likewise, a stop notice can be imposed if the commission believes the person's activities are likely to lead them to commit an offence or contravention of the Act. Does the Lord Chancellor recognise that those measures could interfere with an individual's wholly legal actions? An individual could be treated as if they had already committed an infringement, even if their actions never led to such an infringement. Is not the Electoral Commission's purpose to ensure that elections are run legally and to punish individuals appropriately once an infringement has occurred, and not before? Does the Lord Chancellor not also agree that absolute clarity is needed when qualifying situations that are deemed ““likely”” to lead to an offence? Also of great concern is a proposed change under clause 2 that would give the commission an investigative power akin to a search warrant. The power allows authorised commission staff to enter an individual's or party's premises to access financial records and information. In many situations, not least during an ongoing election campaign, such action would be highly disruptive; it may, in fact, damage the electoral system rather than safeguard it. Does the Lord Chancellor not agree that this power should be used only in the most serious circumstances? Would it not be better to have the power suspended during the period of an election campaign? Would not complaints escalate if it were possible for people to disrupt an opponent's campaign? Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the need to search a premises is so great that it would not be a police matter to begin with. The change under clause 7 that relaxes the political restrictions on membership of the commission is another concern. Currently, people must have had a 10-year period out of politics before they can become a commissioner. That prevents politically active and potentially partisan individuals, such as donors, party members or employees of political parties, from becoming commissioners. I accept the relaxation of political restrictions on the commission's chief executive from 10 to five years out of politics, but I feel that the relaxation for all other commission staff from 10 years to just one year is too extreme. I do not agree that any political member should be allowed to be the chief executive. The commission must be politically savvy, but not at a cost to its independence or credibility. Under the current proposals, it is not unfeasible that someone such as the former Prime Minister, Mr. Blair, could become a commissioner in a year and a day. Does the Lord Chancellor not agree that a period of at least one Parliament, or five years, out of politics is needed for all commission staff, to minimise the possibility of current politicians being investigated by their contemporary rivals—or indeed friends? One issue that is not covered in the Bill but requires serious consideration is the existence of multi-seat electoral divisions and how such boundaries are drawn up. In my constituency, Isle of Wight, 40 seats will be contested at the next county council elections. Among those, there are 38 single-seat electoral divisions and the solitary, and in my view anomalous, two-seat electoral division of Bembridge, Brading and St. Helens. Single-seat divisions enjoy the clear accountability afforded by a single elected member, but an unusual two-seat electoral division is more problematic. Whether a given geographical area has two single-seat divisions or one double-seat division can affect the outcome of an election. For example, in the case of two single-seat divisions, the Conservative party might win one with a large majority and the Labour party the other with a small majority. That is perfectly reasonable, because there will be two clear winners of the seats, one Conservative and one Labour. In a two-seat division covering the same area, with the same votes cast, the Conservative party would win both seats. My concern is that the drawing up of such boundaries could inadvertently lead to a less representative outcome for the voters. At least, it would be inadvertent on the part of the Boundary Commission; it could be a very advertent action by those who propose a multi-member constituency. That is an unacceptable state of affairs, and the matter should be investigated carefully. I agree that current legislation is imperfect and that changes must be made. The public must be shown that the electoral process, from funding to polling, is transparent and fair. I hope that the whole House will agree that we must be careful not to damage the current system or undermine the Electoral Commission's position with the very Bill that is designed to increase efficiency.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

481 c88-90 

Session

2007-08

Chamber / Committee

House of Commons chamber
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