That is a very important point. For example, in a case of a death in custody, if the Secretary of State for Justice, who is responsible for the prison system, were to exercise such powers, he would in effect be a judge in his own cause. We do not need the Human Rights Act to be worried about that; a fundamental principle of the common law is at stake. The Secretary of State is not independent.
The hon. Member for Hendon was right to say that these provisions have nothing inherently to do with terrorism. They include any case of the kind just mentioned. The provision that the simple certificate of the Secretary of State is enough to decide that the jury should no longer sit is almost arrogant in its brutality. On that model of thinking, the Government decide the public interest, and nobody else need apply. If it were a matter of national security, one could understand why that might be the case. However, the provision applies not only to matters of national security but to relations with a foreign state and anything else that might be in the public interest.
As the Government want to resolve the problem—as the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said, it is a serious problem—they need to do so in such a way that the Executive do not just decide the matter for themselves. They should need to apply to an independent court in some way, so that the decision could be challenged and the relatives could appear before the court and say, ““No, there ought to be a jury.”” The Government ought to have to persuade somebody that there is some necessity for such action. The Government's current proposal requires them to persuade nobody. All it requires is the Government to decide for themselves that it would be convenient for them not to have a jury. That is only half the proposal; the other half concerns the special coroner. There is a Government amendment on the subject, but, as other Members have said, it is a fig leaf. It is not sufficient.
It was originally proposed that the coroner should be hand-picked by the Secretary of State. That represents an amazing violation of the separation of powers, and an astonishing violation of constitutional principle. A politician deciding which judicial officer should be responsible for an individual case? I cannot think of a worse violation of principle. It is a rule that would delight Robert Mugabe, and would probably get him into trouble. It is also the most dangerous of dangerous principles, subverting a basic rule of the constitution and a basic principle of the rule of law.
The Government amendment brings the Lord Chief Justice into the picture. It suggests that there should be an approved list of possible special coroners, and that the Lord Chief Justice must agree to any name included in the list. It also allows the Lord Chief Justice a veto when a particular person is chosen, but that is not enough. The right of initiative, throughout the system, still rests with the Secretary of State. Although people can be blackballed by the Lord Chief Justice, only the Executive can propose anyone. That too strikes me as a fundamental violation.
Counter-Terrorism Bill (Programme) (No. 2)
Proceeding contribution from
David Howarth
(Liberal Democrat)
in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 10 June 2008.
It occurred during Debate on bills on Counter-Terrorism Bill (Programme) (No. 2).
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